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PREFACE 
his is already the sixth annual report issued by the CEPS 
Macroeconomic Policy Group, which was reconstituted at the start of 
economic and monetary union in 1999, and the 16
th since CEPS first 
brought together a group of distinguished economists to analyse Europe’s 
economic problems in its founding year, 1983. We proudly list the full set of 
titles at the end of this report. 
For the last several years, our reports have emphasised two disappointing 
developments: a dismal productivity record and a continuing deterioration of 
fiscal policy. Unfortunately our point of view was again vindicated in that 
during the last year these two phenomena continued to affect negatively 
Europe’s performance. A special report of our group in early 2004 provided 
an in-depth analysis of fiscal policy and the controversy surrounding the 
enforcement (or rather the lack of it) of the Stability Pact. This report 
therefore touches only briefly on fiscal policy.  
True to our mission as ‘ECB watchers’, we also analyse at length the 
effectiveness of monetary policy, concentrating this time on the delays 
between monetary policy decisions and their impact on the economy. The 
main result of our analysis is that it is hard to fault the ECB for the policy 
pursued so far. However, we express the hope that the ECB will be patient 
during the upswing that is now apparently starting in earnest to provide 
policy makers in other areas with a window of opportunity to seriously 
pursue structural reforms. 
We wish to acknowledge the valuable contribution of Roberto Perotti on 
fiscal policy. Leonor Coutinho, a Marie Curie Research Fellow at CEPS, also 
provided excellent research assistance and important ideas of her own. All 
remaining errors are ours. 
The work of the CEPS Macroeconomic Policy Group would not have been 
possible without the continuing support from our main sponsor, Deutsche 
Bank, London, and Tudor Investments. I wish to thank them once more for 
their material and financial contributions. 
 
Daniel Gros 
Director 
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Policy Conclusions 
Euroland is now in its fourth year of unsatisfactory growth. What are the 
reasons for this and what can be done about it? This report arrives at the 
following conclusions: 
1. Demographic change is already now reducing the growth potential and 
squeezing government finances. 
2. Insufficient investment is the main driver of the productivity slowdown 
that has weakened growth. 
3. To stimulate investment, better coordination among fiscal, structural and 
monetary policy is needed: Ideally a combination of structural reform, fiscal 
consolidation and low interest rates. The ECB – as the only widely respected 
economic policy-making institution in the EU with room for manoeuvre – 
should become more proactive in pursuing economic policy coordination in 
order to obtain more progress on structural reform and fiscal consolidation.  
4. To foster a more balanced expansion of the world economy and reduce the 
risk of brutal exchange rate movements, greater cooperation among the 
central banks of the US, the EU, Japan and China is needed, giving rise to a 
G4.  
 iv | 6
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Executive Summary 
The economy of Euroland is on track to grow at an unsatisfactory rate for yet 
another year. It is now almost commonplace that the main problems of 
Europe are structural, but one deep underlying factor has received too little 
attention, namely the ageing of the European population. This is not just a 
long-run phenomenon without immediate consequences. We find that 
demographic change is already now reducing the growth potential and 
squeezing government finances.  
There is very little policy can do to change demography. Encouraging higher 
birth rates today would in any event have an impact on the labour force only 
20 years later. Policy-makers, however, could at least prepare for the 
unavoidable. But even this is not being done as shown by the endless 
equivocation over pension reform in a number of member countries. The full 
adjustment of pension systems to the ever-increasing old age dependency 
ratios has not yet taken place. 
Another reason for the structural problems is that productivity has performed 
badly in Euroland over the last years. We show, based on recently available 
data, that part of the problem has been insufficient investment. This finding 
is surprising in light of the fact that investment-to-GDP ratios in Europe have 
not declined dramatically, and the capital stock per worker is still rather high 
because Europe has traditionally had a higher investment rate than the US. 
But there are indications that a large part of the existing capital stock in 
Europe is not in the place where it is needed, namely in the sectors of the 
economy that are expanding. Too much of the existing capital in Euroland is 
immobilised in declining sectors (especially in industry) and too little is 
invested in the growing sectors (especially services) to sustain productivity 
there. 
Why would investment not flow spontaneously into the new sectors? The 
likely reason is that many of them, including a number of services sectors, 
are still heavily regulated in many countries. This is possible because the 
market opening programmes of the EU are usually restricted to trade in 
goods, and only recently has the focus of the internal market programme 
shifted somewhat towards services. We thus conclude that to improve the 
growth outlook, more investment is needed and in different sectors than in 
the past.  
How can this be achieved? Structural reform, especially in the markets for 
services, seems to be a necessary condition for investment to flow to the 
more promising parts of our economies. But policies that increase overall 
investment would also be useful. This implies that a reduction in fiscal 
deficits would be necessary. There has been a lot of discussion of whether 
higher deficits actually help to increase demand in the short run. It is thus not EXECUTIVE SUMMARY| v 
possible to totally dismiss the fear that a fiscal adjustment now would 
somehow lower demand. But it is almost universally agreed that higher 
deficits crowd out private investment. Thus, moving to approximate balance 
from structural deficits of around 2-3% of GDP would free resources that 
could allow overall investment in the EU to increase by 10-15%, which 
would be sufficient to reverse the decline in productivity observed over the 
last 10 years. 
A recovery of the European growth potential thus needs a combination of 
structural reform and fiscal consolidation. It is clear that if this combination 
were to materialise, low interest rates would also help – and would be 
appropriate because higher potential growth would lower the pressure on 
prices. 
But Europe seems to be caught in a reform deadlock: no reform, no fiscal 
consolidation and a monetary policy that only lectures the public about the 
deeper ills of the European economy because the ECB considers that it is 
responsible only for maintaining price stability. We understand the ECB's 
stance, but the malaise in Europe has gone on for so long that there is a real 
danger to price stability in the long run from fiscal fatigue if something is not 
done today. With price stability assured, the ECB – as the only widely 
respected economic policy-making institution in the EU with room for 
manoeuvre – should thus be more ambitious in pursuing its secondary 
mandate and push for economic policy coordination in order to obtain more 
progress on structural reform and fiscal consolidation.  
Our policy prescription would also be justified from a global perspective, but 
here again there is a problem of policy coordination. In our view it could be 
alleviated through greater cooperation among the central banks from those 
economies that dominate the world, namely the US, the EU, Japan and 
China. This G4 would be much more manageable than the G7 and would 
actually bring together the institutions that could really deliver a contribution 
for a more balanced expansion of the world economy to reduce the risk of 
brutal exchange rate movements. | 1 
Chapter 1 
Introduction 
hat are the key challenges and options for EU economic policy-
makers mid-2004? The answer seems obvious: to re-ignite growth 
and transform a hesitant recovery into a longer phase of healthy 
growth. But this seems easier said than done. Structural reforms have not 
really advanced over the last years and it seems that the traditional levers of 
macroeconomic stimulation have also not been used. In this introduction we 
set the scene for the discussion about economic policy by briefly analysing 
two factors that impinge on the economy in the longer run, namely the 
quality of economic policy-making and demographic trends. To conclude 
this introduction, we briefly comment on the enlargement of the EU that has 
taken place recently and ask what effect, if any, it will have on the eurozone. 
1.1  Euroland 2004: Leaner times are here to stay 
The main theme of the Euroland economy in 2004 continues to be weakness 
of both demand and supply. Previous reports of this group already 
documented how the bleak outlook for supply in the medium to long run is 
likely to have caused the weakness of demand (Gros et al., 2003 and 2002).  
Any observer of economy policy-making in Europe must be struck by the 
deterioration in the quality of economic policy in general. This can be seen 
on many fronts: fiscal policy plans constantly go awry, the Lisbon agenda is 
repeatedly invoked but no action is taken, etc. We would argue that this 
disarray among policy-makers can be explained by the fact that the existing 
policies and institutions are geared for a growing economy in which growth 
allows for some redistribution each year. Growth prospect are now rather 
dim throughout most of Euroland due to lower productivity growth and, 
particularly in Germany, due to demographic developments. Economic 
policy-making is thus squeezed on two sides. The slowdown in productivity 
is analysed in more detail below. The impact of demographic developments 
is less well known and will be documented below.  
The squeeze on the potential for re-distribution matters because it has an 
impact on both fiscal and monetary policy. Fiscal policy is deteriorating as 
finance ministers try to save and then discover every year that despite their 
attempts at cutting expenditure, the ratio of public expenditure to GDP does 
not go down and that, year after year, deficits are higher than expected. What 
they fail to understand is that measures that would have redressed the balance 
ten years ago are now barely sufficient to avoid even larger deficits.  
W2 | 6
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Monetary policy is less directly affected by the slowdown in growth and the 
narrowing scope for redistribution. Judging from its own predictions, the 
ECB has also been slow to recognise the fall in potential growth and has thus 
regularly overestimated growth prospects and underestimated inflation. 
However, the magnitude of the error, about half a percent per annum, was 
sufficiently minor that price stability was not seriously put in danger. This 
might change when the pressure on economic policy increases. Experience 
shows that price stability cannot be maintained when extreme pressure is 
exerted on public finances, as occurs for example during times of war. This 
is where the danger lies. The long-run impact of ageing on public finances in 
Europe is actually comparable to the fiscal cost of a major war (see Deutsche 
Bank, 2004).  
1.2  From demographic bonus to malus 
Previous reports of the group have documented in detail the structural nature 
of the slowdown in growth in Europe and the following section provides 
some additional evidence on its causes (as well as its likely persistence). 
What is not widely appreciated is that the impact of ageing will not be felt 
only in 20-30 years, but that it already has a major impact today on the 
economies of some member countries. 
A first important point is that the word ‘ageing’ does not adequately describe 
the problem Europe is facing. It is true that average life expectancy is 
increasing continuously in all developing countries. But the main reason why 
the proportion of the elderly is now expected to almost double over the next 
50 years in Europe is that on average fertility has fallen so much below 
replacement levels that natural population growth has now turned negative, 
and will stay negative for the foreseeable future. Lower birth rates imply of 
course that the average age of the population increases. It is important to 
realise that low birth rates are a phenomenon that is specific to Europe (and 
Japan), but not the US, as can be seen from the demographic projections for 
the EU and the US presented in Table 1.1 below.
1  
This table concentrates on old-age dependency ratios, which constitute a 
measure of the consequences of ageing for public finances since an 
increasing proportion of elderly implies higher pension and health 
expenditures. This table shows that for the EU-15 the old-age dependency 
ratio will, on average, double by the year 2050 to reach over 50%. By 
contrast, the dependency ratio of the US will increase much less and will 
remain about a third lower than that of Europe. Among the major member 
                                                      
1 These projections are already based on the assumptions that fertility in Europe 
will somewhat recover and that the increase in life expectancy will slow down. INTRODUCTION | 3 
 
countries, Germany stands out as having to face a considerably faster ageing 
process than France, for example. 
Table 1.1 Old-age dependency projections 
  2000 2025  2050 
Japan 25.1%  47.0%  64.6% 
US 18.8%  29.3%  34.6% 
France 24.5%  36.0%  45.9% 
Germany 24.2%  39.4%  52.9% 
EU-15 24.4%  36.1%  51.0% 
EU-28 21.5%  31.9%  48.5% 
Sources: US census data (available at http://www.census.gov/ipc/www/idbnew.html) and 
own calculations. 
The old-age dependency ratio is widely used to illustrate the pressure on 
pension systems. However, a better indicator for the overall impact of 
demographic factors on the economy (and thus the pressure on economic 
policy) might be the simple ratio of the working age population to overall 
population. The level of this ratio measures in a certain sense potential GDP 
per capita. Changes in this ratio show, ceteris paribus, to what extent the 
room for re-distribution is affected by demography. For example, if this ratio 
increases by 1%, potential GDP per capita should go up by 1% ceteris 
paribus, i.e. holding total population, productivity, employment rates, etc. 
constant. A fall in this ratio indicates the opposite; potential GDP per capita 
falls, implying that there is less to redistribute to pensioners and other 
interest groups. 
If one looks at the evolution of this indicator for Germany, it becomes 
apparent why the ‘Umverteilungskampf’ (struggle over redistribution) has 
become much tougher in recent years. During the five years preceding 
reunification, demographic factors provided a strong backwind for economic 
policy as the ratio of working age population to total population was 
increasing by about 0.9% per annum. By contrast, during the five years 
leading up to 2005, demographic factors provide a headwind to economic 
policy as this ratio started falling rapidly after 1995, with the deterioration 
during the last five years equivalent to about 0.54% per annum. The total 
deterioration between the late 1980s and now thus amounts to almost 1.5% 
per annum. The German economic system, which until the end of the 1990s 
could count on a demographic bonus every year, was simply not prepared for 
this change. The sails had been set for wind from aft and the country was not 
able to adjust to the fact that the wind is now blowing from the bow. 4 | 6
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It is interesting to see that France is in a quite different position: its 
demographic situation is evolving more slowly, with the important 
deterioration coming only during the next decade. The US has a similar 
pattern as France. In the US the demographic factors will change from plus 
0.2% per annum now to around minus 0.3% in the five years to 2015, which 
is equivalent to a negative change of over 0.5% per annum over the next 10 
years (just when the budget is supposed to be brought under control again). 
Thus, the ageing process already today exerts a strong economic impact in 
some member countries. The data for Germany, which remains the largest 
economy of Euroland, seem to represent the worst case: a combination of 
rapidly worsening demographic factors and lower productivity growth. This 
combination is behind the loss of control over fiscal policy in Germany and 
must also be the main explanation of why the half-hearted reforms 
undertaken so far have been insufficient to turn the economy around. Other 
member countries face less extreme pressure because their demographic 
situation evolves more smoothly, but few member countries will be able to 
escape the twin pressures of worsening demographics and declining 
productivity on economic policy. 
Figure 1.1 Change in demographic potential GDP -25, 65+ 
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1.3  Enlargement: is it important? 
If unsatisfactory growth is the main problem for the EU, the new member 
states are unlikely to cause particular problems. They are growing faster than INTRODUCTION | 5 
 
the old EU-15. The average growth rate of the 8 new member countries from 
Central and Eastern Europe has consistently been 1-2 % points higher than 
that of the eurozone over the last years. Many of the new member countries 
are presently running rather high fiscal deficits, but this is not an immediate 
policy concern at the EU level because they are not subject to the 
enforcement mechanism of the Maastricht Treaty’s prohibition of excessive 
deficits (which is on hold right now in any event following the debacle in the 
Ecofin meeting of November 2003).  
The 10 new member countries have a negligible direct economic impact as 
their economies amount together to only around 5-6% of EU-15 GDP. Since 
they are mostly small countries, however, which depend on the Treaty to 
maintain their influence, they will be more likely to vote in Ecofin for a strict 
application of the Stability Pact (although they cannot participate in the last 
step, the imposition of fines). By 2009, this will change if the Constitutional 
Treaty recently agreed enters into force because the new Treaty foresees that 
non-euro area countries will be excluded from almost all aspects of the 
excessive deficit procedure. 
Three small new member countries (Estonia, Lithuania and Slovenia) just 
entered the ERM2 and a fourth is likely to join later this year. Four of the 
new member countries could thus qualify for euro area membership by late 
2006. Two of these countries (Estonia and Lithuania) have had a currency 
board in place for some time (more than 10 years in the case of Estonia) and 
effectively behaved like ‘shadow’ members of the eurozone. The other two, 
Cyprus and Slovenia, have always managed their currencies rather tightly, 
which was not too difficult given the small size of their economies and hence 
the small scale of their foreign exchange markets. 
Formally the decision on euro area membership could be taken in early 2006, 
on the basis of the data for 2005. On current performance, or rather using the 
currently available forecasts from the European Commission shown in Table 
1.2, three of these four countries should then be able to qualify for euro area 
membership without too much effort. Cyprus would need to reduce its fiscal 
deficit by about 1.5-2.0 points of GDP.  
The main impact of the entry of these four countries in the eurozone would 
not be economic since their combined GDP amounts to less than 1% of that 
of Euroland, but rather political. As small countries, they are likely to defend 
the Treaty and are thus likely to vote for upholding the Treaty provisions 
against excessive deficits in future Ecofin meetings. Their resolve will also 
be strengthened by the fact that they will have been able to join the eurozone 
only if their deficits had previously been kept clearly below 3%.  
 6 | 6
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Table 1.2 Current data and forecasts for the Maastricht criteria for four new 
members of the eurozone 
Panel a) Cyprus 
  2002 2003 2004 2005 
Fiscal  deficit  4.6 6.3 4.6 4.1 
Public  debt  67.1 72.2 74.6 76.9 
Inflation  2.8 4.0 2.2 2.1 
Interest  rate  5.4 4.7    
Panel b) Estonia 
  2002 2003 2004 2005 
Fiscal  deficit*  -1.8 -2.6 -0.7 0.0 
Public  debt  5.7 5.8 5.4 5.3 
Inflation  3.6 1.4 2.8 2.9 
Interest  rate      
* A minus sign indicates a fiscal surplus. 
Panel c) Lithuania 
  2002 2003 2004 2005 
Fiscal  deficit  1.4 1.7 2.8 2.6 
Public  debt  22.8 21.9 22.8 23.2 
Inflation  0.4 -1.1  1.0 2.2 
Interest  rate      
Panel d) Slovenia:  
  2002 2003 2004 2005 
Fiscal  deficit  1.9 1.8 1.7 1.8 
Public  debt  27.8 27.1 28.3 28.2 
Inflation  7.5 5.7 3.8 3.2 
Interest  rate   5.5    
Source: EU Commission, spring forecast. 
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Chapter 2 
Continuing structural weakness? 
he eurozone has now gone through an unprecedented three years of 
near stagnation. Was this just a cyclical phenomenon attributable to a 
combination of external shocks and inadequate macroeconomic policy 
responses? In the short to medium run, cyclical and structural factors always 
interact in a way that makes it nearly impossible to disentangle their relative 
importance. One thing is clear, however: long-term potential growth rates 
have fallen in Europe. This is not just because of lower population growth; 
per capita growth has fallen as well, as extensively documented in previous 
reports of this group (see Gros et al., 2001, 2002 and 2003). This chapter first 
reports some new evidence on the causes of the slowdown of productivity in 
Europe. Section 2.2 then turns to some interesting differences in performance 
within the Euroland economy. 
2.1 Growth  potential 
How can one find out whether there has been a structural slowdown in 
Europe?
2 In view of Blanchard (2004), who has drawn attention to the fact 
that the level of output per hour worked in some important member countries 
is close to the US level, it might be best to concentrate immediately on 
hourly productivity. The table below (taken from Daveri, 2004) shows how 
the growth rate of GDP per hour worked has fallen from around 2.6% per 
annum during the first half of the 1990s to less than 1.5% per year since 
1995. It is not possible to argue that this fall just reflects a cyclical 
phenomenon since the period since 1995 was not worse in terms of business 
cycle than the period 1990-95, which suffered a recession with a fall in real 
GDP, whereas during the period 1995-2002, GDP growth was always 
positive. 
The key fact shown in Table 2.1 is thus that productivity as measured by 
GDP per hour fell by 1.2 percentage points at a time when the opposite 
happened in the US (where hourly productivity growth increased by 0.8% 
points). Given this discrepancy between the US and the European data, it is 
not possible to argue that the dismal performance of the European economy 
in recent years is just a result of a negative shock coming from the global 
business cycle emanating from the US. 
                                                      
2 This section is based on Daveri (2004). 
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Table 2.1 Growth of GDP per hour worked in the EU and the US, 1979-2001 
Total economy, 
OECD data  1970-80 1980-90 1990-95 1995-02 1995-02 
minus 1990-95 
EU-11*  3.6 2.3 2.6 1.4  -1.2 
US  1.6 1.4 1.2 2.0  +0.8 
EU11-minus US +2.0  +0.9  +1.4  -0.6  -2.0 
* EU-11 is used here instead of EU-15 because of limited data availability. 
Source: Daveri (2004). 
Why should productivity growth have fallen in the EU? It is often argued 
that the difference in performance between the EU and the US can be 
explained by the US advantage in new technologies, mainly information 
technologies (IT). However, the gap in IT between the EU and the US can 
not help to explain why Europe’s performance should have deteriorated. 
Europe might be slow to adopt IT, but it certainly has not turned away from 
IT; hence, the causes for the slowdown in Europe (as opposed to the 
transatlantic gap) must be sought elsewhere. One reason for the productivity 
slowdown in Europe might be quite simple: total factor productivity growth 
(TFP) might have declined. 
A definite answer to the question whether capital or TFP was behind the 
EU’s productivity slowdown in the 1990s cannot be given yet. Any answer is 
still tentative because the data necessary to address this issue are available 
only for a subset of EU countries. The limited available information 
suggests, however, that a slowdown in capital deepening – rather than 
diminished TFP growth – is the main culprit for the European slowdown.  
This conclusion emerges when one decomposes the growth rates of value 
added per hour worked into their constituent elements of capital deepening, 
TFP growth and labour quality growth contributions for the US and the 
aggregate EU-4. In turn, the capital deepening component is usefully further 
split into an IT capital component and a non-IT capital component.  
The results tabulated in Table 2.2 below suggest first of all that the European 
productivity slowdown is mostly due to diminished capital deepening of non-
IT goods only. Second, TFP growth has not changed much, continuing at the 
respectable rate of about one percentage point reached in the past. The 
slowdown in the growth rate of labour productivity in the business sector for 
the EU aggregate – milder for the four countries considered here than for the 
EU-15 – is more than accounted for by the diminished contribution of non-IT 
capital (-.45 percentage points) and the worsening in labour quality, which 
has contributed another negative .15 percentage points.  CONTINUING STRUCTURAL WEAKNESS? | 9 
 
Table 2.2 Decomposing aggregate labour productivity growth, business 
sector 
  US EU-4 
Business  sector  1979-95 1995-00 1979-95 1995-00 
Labour productivity growth  1.21  2.46  2.30  2.02 
Contributions to labour productivity growth from: 
IT  capital  .46 .86 .33 .53 
Non-IT  capital  .35 .43 .70 .25 
TFP  growth  .26 1.05 .94 1.07 
Labour  quality  .13 .13 .33 .18 
Source: Daveri (2004). 
On the positive side, instead, business sector productivity has benefited from 
an increase in the already-positive contribution from IT capital (up from .3 to 
.5 percentage points) and from the slight increase in TFP growth (from .9 to 
1.05 percentage points). Hence, at least for the overall business sector, one 
has to concur with Jorgenson (2003) saying that TFP as well as accumulation 
of IT capital are unrelated to the European slowdown in growth of 
productivity. This marks a sharp contrast with the US, where TFP growth 
markedly accelerated, moving from a contribution of .25 to more than 1 
percentage point per year and the contribution of IT capital jumped up almost 
half a percentage point (from .4 to .8 percentage points). Figure 2.1 
documents a strong negative relationship between employment and 
productivity growth, which is a way to illustrate the fall in capital deepening: 
if employment goes up while investment stays constant, the amount of 
capital available per worker declines and hence also productivity declines. 
Hence, the evidence, based on the better data available today, essentially 
confirms the findings in Daveri (2000, 2002) and Gros (2001, 2002), where 
rough overall measures of IT capital and TFP were employed. Other sources 
(e.g. European Commission, 2003) report a small decline in TFP, which 
might appear to be inconsistent with the data reported here. However, the 
data available for the EU-15 does not account for changes in labour quality, 
whose effects are thus attributed to TFP. The more detailed data for the 
quality of the labour force, which are available only for the EU-4, suggest, 
however, that part of the apparent decline of TFP might have been due to a 
deterioration of labour quality. How could labour quality diminish when the 
general level of education is constantly increasing? The explanation for this 
puzzle seems to lie in the fact that during the late 1990s the share of the 
lower skilled in the workforce increased. This had been the aim of many 
labour market reforms, but it had the side-effect of diminishing average 
labour quality and with it, overall productivity. 10 | 6
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Figure 2.1 Productivity and employment growth in Europe and the US 
(1995-2002) 
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Notes: “Employment growth” is the growth rate of total employment; “Productivity 
growth” is the growth rate of GDP per employed person. 
Source: OECD Economic Outlook. 
The more detailed data necessary to distinguish between TFP and labour 
quality are available only until 2000. This implies that the period covered by 
Table 2.2 comprises just the upswing following the 1995 recession. It 
follows that these data are likely to overestimate productivity growth and in 
particular TFP. If one compares periods that are similar in business-cycle 
terms as is done in Table 2.1 (i.e. using the 1995-2002 period), the fall in 
overall productivity would be much larger and the performance of TFP 
would be likely to be much worse. But the detailed data to perform this 
exercise are not yet available. 
Could one expect productivity to improve again over the next few years? 
One way of addressing this question is to start with the official Lisbon goal 
in terms of employment. It is not widely appreciated that there is a capital 
deepening counterpart to the Lisbon employment goal. One of the Lisbon 
policy goals called for the European Union to raise the EU-15 employment 
rate – the ratio of total employment over total working age population – to 
70% by 2010. Given that the current employment rate in the EU-15 is about 
63%, this implies an increment of about 1 percentage point per year over the 
next seven years or so. In turn, if the population in working age keeps 
growing at the past rates of about 0.5 percentage points per year – an average 
of 0.3 p.p. for the native population and 1.2 p.p. for immigrants – total CONTINUING STRUCTURAL WEAKNESS? | 11 
 
employment has to go up by 1.5% per year until 2010 to meet the Lisbon 
employment goal. This is a bit higher than 1.25%, which is the growth rate of 
total employment on average in the EU-15 in 1995-2002, but it is not 
unfeasible, at least in principle. If coupled with a continuation of the long-run 
trend towards a reduction of average hours worked (about half a percentage 
point per year), this translates into an expected increase of the labour input of 
about 1% per year from here to 2010. 
What does this imply in terms of capital deepening, i.e. the growth 
contribution of capital to productivity growth? To come up with an educated 
guess, the past growth rates of the capital stock for the whole economy (e.g. 
for 1996-2000) have to be projected into the future. Based on the data in 
Inklaar et al. (2003) one can obtain estimates ranging between 0.8% per year 
for France and 4.2% per year for the UK, with Germany and the Netherlands 
in between (but much closer to Germany). Hence, a simple continuation of 
past accumulation rates would imply a growth rate of the capital stock of 
about 3% per year for the EU-4. The corresponding growth rate of the capital 
stock per hour worked would be 2% per year and the growth contribution 
from capital deepening would be equal to two-thirds of a percentage point 
per year (at least as long as the value-added share of capital stays unchanged 
at one-third). This compares with 0.78 percentage points computed for the 
EU-4 in the period 1995-2000. 
All in all, this amounts to saying that, if the Lisbon employment goal is taken 
seriously, it would require a much higher investment effort for capital 
deepening to take off again and contribute more to productivity growth in the 
next few years through 2010. If capital accumulation stays constant, the 
contribution from capital deepening would then fall even a bit more, 
implying that at unchanged rates of TFP growth, overall productivity might 
actually fall a bit more (or at least not recover noticeably). 
On top of the capital deepening effect there would be an adverse impact on 
labour quality as the additional employment would have to come from that 
part of the labour force that is at present unemployed, i.e. the lower skilled. 
The data reported above suggest that this could lead to a further loss of 
productivity growth of 10-20 basis points. Hence, one would need a 
considerable increase in capital deepening just to keep productivity from 
falling. 
Under unchanged rates of capital accumulation, there is thus a clear 
contradiction between two Lisbon goals: to increase productivity and to 
increase employment. Figure 2.2 shows this in terms of the two headline 
goals: reaching an employment rate of 70% (more or less the US value) and 
reaching a productivity level of 100% of that of the US. 12 | 6
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Figure 2.2 Lisbon: Employment vs. productivity? 
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The policy implication is straightforward: The only certain way to improve 
productivity growth is to increase capital deepening, i.e. to foster investment. 
This requires structural reforms. Moreover, higher fiscal deficits crowd out 
private investment; hence, enforcement of the Treaty provisions against 
excessive deficits, or, even better, observance of the Stability Pact would 
foster long-run growth prospects. 
2.2  Big and small: Lessons for a more flexible Europe? 
The data on productivity used so far relate mainly to the large member 
countries, which, while dominating the EU average, may not necessarily be 
representative of the entire EU. But this is difficult to document at the 
sectoral detail used above. Other, more easily available data suggest that the 
concentration on large member countries or the European average hides a lot 
of intra-EU variation. Can one discern any systematic pattern in this 
variability across the EU? The answer seems to be yes, if one compares the 
performance of the large and small member states. In recent years, the three 
largest euro area member states (France, Germany and Italy) have 
consistently underperformed on almost any account. As they together 
represent three-fourth of the GDP of the eurozone, their sluggishness is 
behind the underperformance of the eurozone (and of the EU), if compared 
not only to the present US, but also the past performance of the EU itself. CONTINUING STRUCTURAL WEAKNESS? | 13 
 
Table 2.3 shows that on average since 1997 the three ‘euro-dinosaurs’ have 
grown by about 2 percentage points less than the eight small euro area 
member countries. This implies a total underperformance of 10% over this 
five-year period. The much better growth performance of the smaller 
countries has been accompanied by much healthier public finances. The 
second row in the table below shows that the 8 smaller euro area member 
countries have on average run a budget ‘close to balance or in small surplus’, 
which is exactly as required by the Stability Pact. Did they achieve better 
growth performance in spite of or because of this fiscal strictness? Maybe the 
leaders of the big three should reflect more on the long-term benefits of a 
strong fiscal policy, rather than band together to bend the rules against 
excessive deficits according to their short-term political preferences. 
Table 2.3 Small is beautiful? Relative performance of eurozone member 
countries (%) 
  Average of 
big euro-3  Small euro-8 France  Germany  Italy 
Growth 1.93  3.95  2.52  1.53  1.75 
Fiscal balance  -2.06  0.13  2.13  1.99  2.07 
Labour productivity  0.92  1.75  1.22  0.89  0.67 
Share of industry  21.1  17.4  16.8  22.3  23.3 
Notes: Big euro-3 = D+F+IT; Small euro-8 = euro-12 minus D+F+IT+ES. All variables 
average 1997-2002. 
Source: European Commission. 
Could this difference just be due to chance? The question one should ask is 
thus how likely would it be to find the differences in performance actually 
observed between two samples, one of 3 and one of 8 observations, both 
drawn from a uniform population; i.e. a population in which all countries had 
the same mean and variance. A standard t-test along these lines shows that 
the probability of observing the difference between big and small would be 
only about 8.7%, if the underlying performance of the two groups were the 
same. A non-parametric test based on a two-sample Wilcoxon rank-sum 
(Mann-Whitney) test yields a similar result: the probability of finding the 
sample difference is only 6.6%.
3 These are just the results on one variable: 
real GDP growth rates. As the smaller countries also perform better in terms 
of other variables, as documented below, it is difficult to avoid the 
conclusion that smaller countries are somehow different. 
Why are smaller countries able, on average, to perform better? Inflation was 
somewhat higher in the smaller countries so that they faced also lower real 
                                                      
3 See Gros (2004). 14 | 6
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interest rates. But this factor alone would not be enough to explain a growth 
differential of this size. A more fundamental factor that might play an 
important role is the fact that the big euro-3 have more structural adjustment 
to undergo. The fourth row of Table 2.3 illustrates one area in which the 
larger economies see a source of strength transformed into a handicap: as 
long as markets were separated, the larger member countries offered a larger 
home market and were thus a better location for industry than their smaller 
EU partners. With the arrival of the single market and the euro, this 
comparative advantage has disappeared. At the same time, the competitive 
pressure on industry increases, not only from the worldwide process of 
globalisation, but also because of enlargement. In the past the rather high 
share of industry in employment in the big euro-3 (21% of the workforce) 
might have been a source of strength. Today it is a problem that might 
explain part of their underperformance, at least if compared to the smaller 
member countries where the share of industry is – at 17% of the workforce – 
already much lower. 
The problems associated with adapting to the inevitable trend of de-
industrialisation of modern economies is the one key element that 
distinguishes France from the other two large Euroland economies, Germany 
and Italy. Because France has a lower share of its population in industry, it is 
on this account closer to the smaller member countries than to its big 
neighbours to the East and South. This might also be the reason why France 
performs somewhat better on productivity. 
Smaller member countries are not just lucky in that they happen to have less 
of a problem with de-industrialisation. They have also clearly been able to 
react much better to the shocks that have buffeted the world economy 
recently. External shocks, such as the 9/11 terrorists attacks or the Iraq war 
are routinely used as an excuse for the weakness of the European economy. 
This assertion can be tested in a simple way: if it were true, one would expect 
that small countries would be hit stronger than the large countries because 
the smaller member countries have much larger exposure to the rest of the 
world than the larger member countries. However, the data indicate exactly 
the contrary. As the table below shows the small euro area countries have 
continued to outperform the big euro-3 (D+F+IT) by a considerable margin 
even during the turbulent period since 2001.  
Table 2.4 Real growth: Big versus small 
 2001  2002  2003  (est.) 
Big euro-3  1.39%  0.59%  0.2% 
Small euro-8  1.98%  1.34%  1.2% 
Note: Big euro=D+F+IT; Small euro=euro12 minus (D+F+IT+ES). 
Source: European Commission.  CONTINUING STRUCTURAL WEAKNESS? | 15 
 
All this suggests that the key advantage of the smaller countries might just be 
that they are more flexible. In a smaller country, everyone – the general 
public, the trade unionists and the politicians –knows that it is the country 
that has to adjust if external conditions change. The response to a negative 
external shock might be quite different in different countries. Countries with 
a corporatist approach might opt for a general wage restraint (Austria, the 
Netherlands), whereas other countries might opt for greater flexibility of 
labour markets (Denmark?), etc. But the key is that the need for internal 
adjustment is generally accepted in small countries. By contrast, the 
discussions in France, Germany and Italy about the need for reform are 
almost exclusively conducted in domestic political terms. External pressures 
play only a subordinate role. Fertig & Kluve (2004) show that there is no 
lack of academic contributions on what needs to be done, but both do not 
focus on the role of European integration as one of the drivers of reform. 
The concerted action by France and Germany at the end of last year to stop 
the sanctions mechanism of the Stability Pact was symptomatic of this state 
of affairs. Almost all the smaller countries were hostile to the Franco-
German position (which had quiet support from Italy). Very strong political 
pressure was needed to prevent the majority of smaller countries to vote for 
the Commission proposals. (For more details, see Gros et al., 2004.) The case 
of Portugal, which had missed the 3% limit for just one year, was completely 
different. There, the country did not oppose the measures proposed by 
Brussels, the deficit was brought down within one year and, according to 
media reports, the political party that had to push the tough adjustment 
measures through its Parliament actually gained in popularity. 
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Chapter 3 
Fiscal Policy: How to assess and maintain 
sustainability?  
his brief chapter concentrates on the dilemma that is at the heart of the 
discussion of the Stability and Growth Pact (SGP) today. It is almost 
universally agreed that some limits are needed to ensure that fiscal 
policy remains sustainable, but there is little agreement on how to measure 
sustainability. The justification of the French and German governments in 
continuing to run deficits above 3% is that this is only temporary and does 
not ‘really’ impair sustainability. But can one trust this argument? 
Section 3.2 thus reviews various proposals to reform the Stability and 
Growth Pact in light of this issue. Section 3.3 then turns to the main reason 
why the SGP makes sense in a ‘greying’ Europe.  
3.1 Introduction 
The Treaty of Maastricht, Article 109j(i) makes the “sustainability of the 
government financial position” a precondition for eligibility in the European 
Monetary Union. ‘Sustainability’ is implicitly proxied in the Treaty by 
compliance with the well-known deficit and debt criteria (although the latter 
has never been enforced). There is no universally accepted definition of 
‘sustainability’ among economists, but perhaps the most common definition 
is that a fiscal policy is sustainable if the present discounted value of all 
future primary surpluses is sufficient to pay for the initial debt plus the 
current primary deficit. This condition is equivalent to assuming that debt 
does not grow ‘too fast’ in the limit, or equivalently, that the government is 
not running a ‘Ponzi scheme’, by borrowing more and more without ever 
repaying the debt.  
Although the Maastricht criteria were clearly not designed with this notion in 
mind, their focus on the current deficit can be loosely interpreted in light of 
the notion of long-term sustainability: to the extent that the current deficit is 
simply a result of given institutions and policies, and to the extent that 
institutions and policies are persistent, then the current deficit is a good 
proxy for fiscal policy in the medium run. While this connection between the 
Maastricht criteria and sustainability is admittedly loose, it is probably the 
best rationalisation one can give of the Maastricht criteria.  
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3.2  Proposals for reform 
The above-described connection between the Maastricht criteria and 
sustainability is also perhaps the best conceptual framework for 
understanding the recent spate of proposals to modify domestic fiscal 
institutions and the Stability and Growth Pact.  
3.2.1  Multi-year budgets and structural reforms 
According to the first proposal, it is argued that in several cases the effects 
on the budget deficit of structural reform packages are likely to manifest 
themselves a few years after the initial implementation of the package, while 
initially the reform could even lead to a higher deficit. In this case, the 
increase in the current deficit, perhaps above the Maastricht threshold of 3% 
of GDP, would send exactly the wrong signal about the effect of the reform 
on the sustainability of public finances, i.e. about the present discounted 
value of future primary surpluses.  
Thus, the thrust of the proposal is that the Maastricht criteria should be 
relaxed in the case of those structural reforms with delayed effects on the 
budget; conversely, a strict application of the criteria would needlessly 
discourage those reforms that are good for sustainability – the dimension one 
should really care about – but bad for the deficit in the very short run.  
To give a concrete example, the French and Italian governments have 
recently proposed (and partially enacted) reforms of their pensions systems 
which should yield substantial savings starting around the year 2008. The 
present value of the savings has variously been estimated at more than 10% 
of GDP. Given these large prospective savings, the governments seem to 
have a strong point when they argue that it does not make sense to criticise 
them for not reducing their deficits more quickly in the current year or next. 
The Commission should thus stop checking simply whether fiscal deficits are 
above or below the arbitrary threshold of 3% of GDP and should instead 
concentrate on longer-term sustainability. 
The first problem with this argument is that the current government cannot 
pre-commit the actions of future governments, and not even its own future 
actions. But if its announcement of future reductions of the deficit are taken 
at face value, this creates an obvious incentive to run a loose fiscal policy 
now, and compensate for this by announcing that the present discounted 
value of the deficit will be reduced by future actions, for instance a medium-
term package of drastic structural reforms implying large budget savings in 
the medium run. But when the future comes, there is no reason the 
government in power at that point should feel bound to implement the 
measures announced in the past.  18 | 6
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The second problem with this proposal is that, even abstracting from the 
time-consistency problem illustrated above, there is an obvious incentive to 
overestimate the budget savings from the medium-run package – for instance 
by assuming implausibly strong behavioural responses of the private sector 
to the package. Note that this is distinct from the first problem, because it can 
occur even if somehow the current government could credibly pre-commit 
the action of future governments. This is indeed a pattern that one frequently 
sees in the medium-term plans of national budgets: when a government 
decides to run a loose fiscal policy in a given year, it maintains a claim to 
fiscal rectitude by forecasting dramatic declines in the future deficits after the 
initial ‘unavoidable’ and ‘special’ increase in the current year. For instance, 
the first budget plan of the Berlusconi government in Italy forecast a GDP 
growth over the next five years at 3% per year, partly as a consequence of the 
supply effects of the deficit-increasing fiscal measures in its first year. The 
German government used almost exactly the same approach to justify its 
own tax reform in the year 2000: it will increase the current deficit a bit, but 
this will be more than compensated for by positive supply effects later on. 
We all know how things went; the point is that forecasting growth at 3% for 
five years costs nothing, and can be readily used to justify a claim to fiscal 
responsibility over the medium run, while making room for any type of 
behaviour in the short run. 
There is a third reason to be sceptical about the value of longer-term reform 
promises: quite simply, no reform plan can encompass the entire budget. A 
longer-term pension reform plan that promises substantial future savings 
because the retirement age will be increased in 2020 does not necessarily 
imply that future deficits will be lower. Even if the provision were 
implemented in the year 2020 exactly as originally planned, in the meantime 
the government might compensate various groups by lowering contribution 
rates, or easing the access to invalidity and disability pensions as imperfect 
substitutes of early retirement pensions that are being phased out, etc. Even if 
the government could pre-commit itself or future governments to the pension 
reform package, there is no way the whole range of possible developments in 
the remaining part of the budget can be forecast.  
The solutions to these problems that have been proposed usually come under 
the heading of some form of a ‘debt board’, independent bodies of prominent 
individuals who monitor the evolution of fiscal policy. In one version, the 
board would be a national institution that would have the power to intervene 
in fiscal policy at the national level when longer-term sustainability is 
threatened. This strong version of the board runs into an obvious, 
insurmountable difficulty: to fulfil this mission, it should have the power to 
override expenditure increases, implement its own tax hikes and more 
generally to take fiscal measures independently of the executive and the 
legislative branches of government. It is apparent that in modern SUSTAINABLE FISCAL POLICY | 19 
 
democracies this kind of decision cannot be left to an ‘independent’ body; 
and even if for some reason this were the case, the executive and legislative 
branches could always rescind these powers the moment they conflict with 
their own goals.  
This strong version of the debt board probably has very few proponents these 
days, at least in Europe. But a weaker version has many advocates. This 
independent body would evaluate the projections of the government 
regarding the effects of the reform package. Thus, its main role would be to 
provide a check on the internal coherence, consistency and plausibility of the 
government’s assumptions and projections. In a sense, it would make more 
visible, and hence politically costly, a flagrant departure from realism and 
plausibility.  
What would happen if the debt board and the government disagreed on the 
projections and on the assumed effects of fiscal policy? Perhaps the debt 
board could make different, more realistic assumptions on, say, the future 
rate of growth of the economy. But could it make different assumptions on, 
say, the increase in the retirement age if it deems that the package has no 
probability of being implemented as is in the future? Even the most 
independent evaluators of fiscal policy would probably have to accept at face 
value the evolution of the parameters legislated in the reform package; for 
instance, it would have to accept as a given in its projections the effects of a 
reform package that might increase the level of pensions today, but also 
increases the retirement age starting in the year 2020.  
But even if it does not have to accept these projections, once the current 
government and the debt board disagree on the likely future impact of the 
reform package, the consequence would be protracted litigation. There is no 
fire-proof methodology to assess the impact of a future policy – my 
projection is as good as yours. Perhaps after many years the debt board might 
show a better track record at forecasting: but the notion of the standard error 
of forecasts is usually not part of the political discourse. And if the political 
survival of the government is at stake, the winner cannot be the debt board.  
Hence, realistically a debt board could have at most a role akin to that of 
rating agencies or of the European Commission forecasters, but with more 
visibility and a higher standing. As a dedicated body of highly regarded 
experts with established reputations in the field, it would provide 
authoritative, frequent and documented forecasts of future fiscal 
developments, perhaps based on alternative scenarios. Unlike in rating 
agencies or international organisations, here several persons would work 
year-round at monitoring all the developments in the budget and making 
forecasts of future developments. Hence, this part of the job description of 
the debt board is more akin to that of agencies like the Congressional Budget 
Office in the US. In addition, the debt board would also have the power to 20 | 6
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issue informal warnings on fiscal policy whenever its members feel there is 
such need, and ultimately it could act as the whistle-blower on fiscal policy. 
Any power beyond this is in our opinion unrealistic, and in any case unlikely 
to survive the first political skirmish.  
3.2.2  The golden rule 
A second frequent argument for a reform of the Maastricht criteria has to do 
with productive government spending. Suppose the current deficit increases 
because of higher spending on large infrastructure projects; presumably, once 
in place this infrastructure will raise the productivity of the entire economy; 
the resulting increase in GDP will lead to higher revenues that will offset the 
current higher spending. Once again, in this case the increase in the current 
deficit should not be interpreted as a signal of deteriorating sustainability, 
since future surpluses will rise correspondingly. Thus, according to this 
‘golden rule’ argument, productive government spending – essentially, 
government capital expenditure – should be exempted from the computation 
of the deficit relevant for the Maastricht criteria.  
There are at least two problems with this argument. First, it is based on the 
assumption that a euro spent on items that are classified as government 
investment increase GDP on average so much as to generate a flow of extra 
revenues (in present discounted value terms) equal to the initial spending. To 
get an idea of the magnitudes involved, if t is the average marginal tax rate 
for the whole economy, the present discounted value (PDV) of GDP should 
increase by 1/t for any extra euro of government investment. With an average 
t in Europe of about .4, the present discounted value of GDP should increase 
by 2.5 times the initial investment, and this ignoring depreciation of the 
capital stock. We believe there is no empirical evidence supporting this 
assumption. Of course, the infrastructure could be self-financed by user fees: 
but such cases are quite rare in the case of capital spending by the general 
government.  
 A second problem is that in practice there is considerable leeway in defining 
what exactly constitutes capital spending by the government. There is non-
trivial variation among OECD countries in how they classify certain 
spending, sometimes in open contrast to the new System of National 
Accounts. The Golden Rule would create an irresistible temptation to 
reclassify as capital spending as many items as possible, something that has 
invariably occurred in the experience of those Latin American countries that 
have adopted similar rules. One could argue that Eurostat is there precisely to 
enforce a uniform set of rules. But the experience of the recent past shows 
that there is ample scope for lengthy litigation, even on items that were 
seemingly very precisely defined such as privatisation proceeds. At best, this 
protracted litigation would just add to the uncertainty of the process. SUSTAINABLE FISCAL POLICY | 21 
 
3.2.3 Debt   
A third argument for a relaxation of the focus on the current deficit is that it 
does not take into account the existing level of debt. Although it is not often 
cast in these terms, it is useful to rationalise this argument in terms of our 
notion of sustainability. Recall that fiscal policy is sustainable if the present 
discounted value of current and future surpluses equals the current debt. If 
the current deficit is assumed to be somehow a predictor of future fiscal 
policy, a lower debt is compatible with a higher current deficit.  
It is difficult to argue with this reasoning. In practice, conditioning the 
admissible deficit to the level of the debt requires reintroducing a parameter, 
the debt-to-GDP ratio, which has never been enforced, even in the run-up to 
the EMU. It will be very difficult politically for countries with a high debt-
GDP ratio to accept a new rule that heavily penalises them when they are 
already running against the limits imposed by the current, weaker, rules. And 
because it takes many years to reduce a high debt-GDP ratio like that of 
Belgium or Italy to the EU average, this rule would divide countries into 
near-permanent categories – again a status that is likely to be very difficult 
for many countries to accept politically.  
3.3  The enduring purpose of the Pact  
Where does all this leave us? On one hand, the Maastricht Treaty and the 
Stability and Growth Pact are under heavy criticism from many quarters, and 
their credibility is currently in shatters after the November 2003 debacle. On 
the other hand, we have raised serious doubts on the rationale for the main 
proposals of reform.  
Academics and policy-makers routinely bemoan the lack of a sound 
economic rationale for the main provisions of the Pact. We all know that the 
figures in the Pact – 3% and 60% – do not and cannot have any particular 
standing in any theory. The main justification for imposing some limit on 
fiscal policy probably cannot be formalised in a coherent model, but still 
should not be dismissed lightly. It is the argument that, loosely speaking, the 
ability in EMU to conduct an independent monetary policy geared to the 
control of inflation would be somehow impaired by the presence of countries 
with a protracted record of severe policy mismanagement, of which fiscal 
indiscipline is one key manifestation. To make a concrete example, we 
believe the type of behaviour the Maastricht Treaty had in mind was the 
Italian habit of running deficits of close to 10% of GDP that lasted for about 
15 years – not the German deficits of 3.5 to 4% over two to three years. 
However, a rule is a rule; hence, once it is written in a Treaty it must be 
enforced if it is not to lose all credibility. 22 | 6
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But, perhaps little noticed by many observers, the type of deficit limit 
enshrined in the Treaty and the Pact is acquiring a new important function of 
its own. As is well known, European societies are ageing fast, implying an 
increasing burden on government finances – by the Commission’s estimates 
and based on prudential estimates of the demographic trends, between 3 and 
5% of GDP in the typical European country over the next generation. 
Economic theory suggests that in order to minimise distortions, tax rates 
should be kept approximately constant over time, rather than follow the ups 
and downs of government spending – hence, if spending is anticipated to 
increase in the future, governments should run surpluses initially when 
spending is low in anticipation of higher deficits when spending increases 
later.  
However, current governments might have little incentive to ‘smooth’ taxes 
over time: why should the current government incur the electorate’s wrath by 
setting high tax rates now in anticipation of higher spending that will most 
likely come under a different government? Thus, in the absence of deep cuts 
in non-age-related spending programmes for which European governments 
and societies seem to have very little appetite, the provisions of the Treaty 
and the Pact come in handy to force governments to apply some form of tax 
smoothing despite these skewed incentives. Indeed, by one estimate (see 
CEPS, 2003, for details), in order to hold tax rates approximately constant at 
the current levels at the population ages, the balance of the government 
accounts of the typical European government today should be between 0 and 
a surplus of 2% of GDP, which is exactly what the Pact calls for.  
So the Pact still has a purpose. To be implementable and enforceable, 
however, one feature will have to be improved on. Few observers have 
noticed that much of the trouble leading up to the November 2003 events 
was caused by a spectacular failure in forecasting growth and the deficit. In 
fact, in May 2003, Germany appeared to be well on course, based on 
forecasts approved by the Commission, to keep its promise to Ecofin of early 
2003 – holding the budget deficit within the 3% limits. But then the growth 
prospects for Germany – both actual and potential – were revised drastically 
downwards, and not for the first time in recent years. This is when the 
trouble started.  
In fact, an analysis of recent budget forecasts by the Commission (see Gros, 
2004) shows that the Commission (and indeed many other organisations) 
consistently over-predicted actual and potential growth, and under-predicted 
both the cyclically adjusted and the actual deficits. More precisely, the 
standard deviation of the forecasts of the deficits, just 3 quarters ahead, is 
more than a percentage point of GDP – a large number when almost all 
European countries are teetering on the brink of the fateful 3% deficit limit.  SUSTAINABLE FISCAL POLICY | 23 
 
The inadequacy of the forecasts used in the excessive deficits procedure is 
also illustrated in Figure 3.1, which shows how almost invariably budgets are 
planned to improve in the near future, but in reality they have tended to 
deteriorate over the last years. Since Figure 3.1 shows the cyclically adjusted 
budget balances, this gap between plan and reality cannot just be ascribed to 
the cyclical downturn, which lasted longer than expected. A more realistic 
explanation is that, as argued above, governments have an incentive to assert 
that regrettably they are running large deficits today, but that the situation 
will soon improve. For example, in the year 2000, the cyclically adjusted 
deficit was supposed to improve to 0.5% of GDP until 2002, whereas the 
actual outcome was then 2% of GDP. 
Figure 3.1 Cyclically adjusted deficit (forecasted) 
-2.5
-2.0
-1.5
-1.0
-0.5
0.0
1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005
Year
C
y
c
l
i
c
a
l
y
 
A
d
j
u
s
t
e
d
 
D
e
f
i
c
i
t
 
(
%
 
o
f
 
G
D
P
)
Aut 99 Forecast
Aut 00 Forecast
Aut 01  Forecast
Aut 02 Forecast
Aut 03 Forecast
 
This suggests that, in order to be credible and to have a minimal chance of 
enforceability, the Pact needs to rely on more realistic forecasts. Part of the 
problem is that, for political reasons, the Commission and Ecofin are often 
forced to accept unrealistic forecasts on budget items until they are no longer 
defensible – usually only a few months before showdown time. Thus, some 
form of independent monitoring and political pressure, as envisioned in some 
variants of the proposals of a debt board, could come in handy here. An 
independent institution should be designed to assess the credibility and 
realism of government forecasts, not only of growth, but also of discretionary 
measures. To be effective, this would necessarily involve taking a stance on 
both the political feasibility and technical aspects of these proposals. For 
example, one set of dubious proposals that should have been challenged were 
the first Berlusconi budgets, which, repeating claims made by several of their 
predecessors, budgeted in ‘savings’ from the expansion of internet 24 | 6
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procurement on the order of €3 to €4 billion per year, when all the experts 
were warning that this was merely wishful thinking. Nothing of course came 
of this, and the special agency designed to achieve these savings is now 
being dissolved.  
The Commission could not, and should not, be involved in scrutinising and 
possibly confronting national governments on the feasibility of specific 
budget issues. Thus, this task should be left to another institution, possibly an 
independent body set up for this purpose. In addition, governments should be 
forced to testify in front of their own Parliaments to explain any slippage in 
their medium-term plans, perhaps following a negative report from the 
Commission, thus enhancing the political ownership of these plans. 
We have argued here, and on previous occasions, that the limit on 
‘excessive’ deficits enshrined in the Maastricht Treaty should be enforced. 
The new Constitutional Treaty agreed at the Brussels European Council of 
June 2004 did not propose changes in the economic part of the Treaty. The 
Maastricht criteria and the excessive deficit procedure (EDP) thus have not 
been materially modified. However, the new definition of what constitutes a 
qualified majority will have an impact on the way in which the EDP can be 
enforced once the new Treaty enters into force (see box below). 
Box 3.1 Implications of the new Constitutional Treaty for enforcement of 
the excessive deficit procedure (EDP) 
If one simulates the new requirements for a qualified majority for a eurozone 
of 12 members, one finds the following: 
First, the requirement of the assent of 72% of member states means that the 
procedure can be blocked by any four member states that do not support 
sanctions (or any steps along the procedure). This was not the case until now. 
The 65% of population requirement has more complicated consequences 
because it has to be seen together with the fact that the country concerned 
does not vote. The latter implies that the total basis for calculating the 
percentage in population terms is lower in the case of a procedure against a 
large country. As a consequence, two ‘large’ member countries can already 
constitute a blocking minority. Under the present system this was also the case 
for a procedure against a large country, but not against a small country. The 
new system thus makes it more difficult to enforce the EDP. Before it was not 
enforceable against large countries, now it becomes difficult to enforce even 
against small countries. 
 | 25 
Chapter 4 
Assessment of Monetary Policy 
gainst the background of lacklustre growth, slowly receding 
consumer price inflation, a rising euro and deteriorating government 
finances, the ECB followed a policy of ‘wait-and-see’. While this 
policy seems to have been broadly appropriate, glitches in communicating it 
to the markets reappeared. Moreover, the ECB failed to clarify and explain 
its policy with regard to its secondary objective of “support[ing] the general 
economic policies of the Community”. In our view, there are grounds for the 
ECB to take a more pro-active approach to the coordination of fiscal, 
structural and monetary policy. 
At the international level, the ECB had to deal with reflationary pressures 
emanating from very easy monetary policies in the US and Asia. The 
response was in line with the ECB’s mandate and historical patterns: The 
ECB accepted a rising exchange rate but at the same time followed an easier 
monetary policy than it would probably have pursued otherwise. To avoid 
monetary policy spillover, we see the need for more coordination of 
monetary policy at the international level. 
4.1  Monetary policy conduct and the economy 
Developments over the last 12 months were characterised by sluggish 
growth, until recently gradually receding inflation, appreciation of the euro 
and a deterioration of government finances. The ECB followed a policy of 
‘wait-and-see’, which seems to have been appropriate under the 
circumstances. Clarification of the ECB’s monetary policy strategy fostered a 
better understanding of the ECB’s conduct by market participants. But the 
more indirect and circumspect communication style of the new ECB 
President Jean-Claude Trichet, who succeeded Wim Duisenberg in 
November 2003, contributed to misunderstandings and confusion on the part 
of market participants. 
4.1.1 Lacklustre  growth 
Following a minor contraction in the first half of 2003, the Euroland 
economy embarked upon a moderate expansion in the second half. The turn-
around was caused by a sharp jump in net exports, which more than 
compensated for the continued weakness of domestic demand growth. As a 
result, real GDP in the third quarter of 2003 grew by 1.6% in seasonally 
adjusted annualised terms after a contraction by 0.4% in the preceding 
period. 
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The spark emanating from net exports ignited investment growth and 
stockbuilding in the fourth quarter of last year. However, private 
consumption failed to pick up, raising doubts about the sustainability of the 
recovery. The fear of job losses, worries about cuts in social benefits in the 
wake of structural reform and continuing false perceptions of higher inflation 
weighed on consumer confidence and depressed private consumption 
growth. 
GDP growth accelerated to an annualised rate of 2.4% in the first quarter of 
2004. Net exports contributed strongly to growth while domestic demand 
growth remained sluggish. There was considerable divergence in growth 
among countries (with France leading among the larger countries and 
Germany and Italy lagging – a pattern already discussed in Chapter 2).  
Figure 4.1 Components of the misery index 
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Source: European Commission/Haver Analytics. 
The outlook for the next 12-18 months points to a continuation of growth 
close to its potential rate, provided that consumption finally recovers. The 
risks to this outlook, however, remain on the downside. Some observers have 
pointed to growth abroad as a safeguard against a renewed slide of the 
Euroland economy into stagnation. Since the foreign surplus of a country 
cannot rise indefinitely, however, foreign demand growth can replace 
domestic demand growth only on a temporary basis. At some stage, higher 
foreign demand has to lift domestic demand. 
In Euroland, net exports have often sparked a resurgence of investment and 
job growth, which then kicked-off consumption growth. In the event, the 
engine of GDP growth has been domestic demand growth (see Figure 4.2 for ASSESSMENT OF MONETARY POLICY | 27 
 
the example of France). But the present recovery will run out of steam if the 
spark presumed to emanate from exports is extinguished by a lack of 
confidence before it reaches domestic demand. There are indeed worrisome 
signs that investors lack the confidence to use profits from exports to expand 
capacities and hire more workers at home. The main motive for domestic 
investment seems be replacement of depreciated capital, while companies 
seem to prefer to increase capacities abroad. 
Some observers have pointed to Euroland’s current account surpluses as a 
sign of the health and competitiveness of the economy. However, current 
account surpluses are the mirror image of capital account deficits. Against 
the background of weak investment at home, long-term capital outflows are a 
vote of no confidence by companies and individual investors in the domestic 
economy. 
Figure 4.2 France: Real GDP and domestic demand growth 
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Sources: INSEE/H, INSEE/Haver. 
With investment undertaken primarily to maintain instead of expand 
capacities, employment growth remains sluggish. This situation, in 
combination with further increases of indirect and payroll taxes, is 
dampening real disposable income growth. With continued uncertainty about 
reform of the social security system and the labour market exerting upward 
pressure on the savings rate, private consumption growth also remains 
subdued. 28 | 6
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Figure 4.3 Real disposable income and private consumption growth in major 
OECD countries (average increase over 2001-03) 
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4.1.2  Mixed inflation developments 
Consumer price inflation was subject to opposing influences. Lacklustre 
growth and a stronger euro contained wage inflation and reduced companies’ 
scope for price increases. At the same time, rising commodity prices and 
indirect tax increases exerted upward pressure on headline inflation. On 
balance, underlying inflation appears to have declined slowly while headline 
inflation has fluctuated around 2%. 
With GDP growth expected to climb at most towards its potential rate during 
the coming 12-18 months, the output gap is unlikely to close. This will 
sustain downward pressure on underlying inflation in the intermediate future. 
However, developments of monthly inflation rates will remain bumpy as 
base effects, indirect tax changes and fluctuations of commodity prices 
continue to affect headline inflation. ASSESSMENT OF MONETARY POLICY | 29 
 
Figure 4.4 Euroland: Harmonised inflation (% change, year on year) 
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Source: Eurostat/Haver. 
There have been fears that rising commodity prices and indirect tax increases 
could push inflation higher in the medium-term. But this would only be the 
case when these price shocks could be used by companies as an excuse to 
widen profit margins or if workers could push up wage inflation. However, 
with the economy sluggish and unemployment high, neither is likely to 
occur. Rather, indirect tax increases and terms-of-trade losses will lower real 
disposable income growth and weaken private consumption. Thus, an 
increase in the price level on the back of these price shocks now could cause 
weaker growth and lower inflation in the future. 
Money growth above the ECB’s reference value for the third year in a row 
has raised concerns about a resumption of inflation in the longer term. Part of 
the recent variations in money growth may have reflected changes in the 
demand for liquid balances in the wake of the stock market downturn. Thus, 
it seems that M3 components first increased as stocks declined and that part 
of this increase was unwound as the stock market recovered. However, 
estimated long-term money demand still falls short of the actual money 
stock, suggesting that considerable excess liquidity remains in the economy. 
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Box 4.1 Money demand and excess liquidity 
Using a long-run money demand function recently estimated by Deutsche 
Bank (see Biggs, 2003), we can assess the level of excess liquidity from the 
residuals of the equation. The equation expresses real money demand as a 
function of real GDP, short- and long-term interest rates, and equity prices 
(calculated as the average of the French CAC and German DAX indices). In 
an estimation for the period from the first quarter of 1980 to the first quarter 
of 2004, the hypothesis of cointegration of the variables cannot be rejected, 
pointing to an economically significant and stable relationship between the 
dependent and independent variables. 
rm3 = -6.593 + 1.544rgdp -0.087equipr – 0.0069by10 – 0.002i3m 
 (-46.9)  (40.1)  (-9.4)  (-2.3)  (-1.2) 
adj.R2=0.99; DW=0.39; ADF=-3.11 
where rm3 denotes real M3 (in log levels), rgdp real GDP (in log levels), 
equipr equity prices (in log levels), by 10 10-year bond yields, and i3m 3-
month interest rates. Adj.R2 measures the fit of the equation, DW 
autocorrelation of residuals, ADF is a test statistic for stationarity of residuals, 
and t-values are given in parentheses below coefficients. 
Although equity prices increased recently, the difference between the actual 
money stock and the money stock explained by the long-run equation in the 
more recent past was positive and rather large. This was the result of 
downward pressure on money demand from sluggish real GDP growth. 
Hence, the available stock of real money exceeded the level consistent with 
money demand in the long-term. 
Figure 4.5 Euroland: Residuals of the long-run money demand equation 
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The error correction equation to the long-run equation confirms the 
cointegrating relationship between the dependent and independent variables. 
However, with the error correction term being the only significant exogenous 
variable, it remains unclear how the error correction process is achieved. 
There are several ways how the ‘excess liquidity’ can disappear: 1) through an 
acceleration of real GDP growth, 2) through an acceleration of inflation and 3) 
through an endogenous unwinding (in the form of an error correction process, 
whereby excess liquidity is shifted into longer-term financial investments). 
Unfortunately, our approach is unable to identify the precise way of the 
unwinding of excess liquidity ex ante. There is the risk of higher inflation in 
the longer-term, but it is unclear whether this risk will materialise. 
drm3 = 0.004 + 0.515 drm3(-1) – 0.095ecm; adj.R2=0.99; AC(1) = 0.44 
 (5.1)  (6.6)  (-4.0) 
where drm3 denotes the change in logs of real M3, ecm the error correction 
term, and AC(1) a Chi-Square distributed Lagrange multiplier test statistic for 
first order serial correlation of residuals. 
Figure 4.6 Euroland: Error correction equation for money growth 
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Excess liquidity does not necessarily raise consumer price inflation in the 
future. It could also push up asset prices. The latter was the case in Japan 
during the 1980s, when excess liquidity was contained within the business 
sector, inducing companies to bid up each other’s share prices and the price 
of commercial real estate. Although the structure of the Euroland economy is 32 | 6
TH ANNUAL REPORT OF THE CEPS MACROECONOMIC POLICY GROUP 
 
different from that of Japan in the 1980s, there are other forces at work 
which may funnel excess liquidity into asset price increases.
4 
Owing to the integration of the former communist countries and China into 
the world economy, the supply of goods has become fairly price elastic. At 
the same time, the price elasticity of the supply of services has been 
increased by the use of productivity-enhancing information and 
communications technologies in this sector (e.g. the rise of e-commerce). 
This suggests that a liquidity-driven increase in demand causes a larger 
volume than price response. Against this, the supply of assets is likely to be 
much less elastic owing to the home bias of investors and remaining 
restrictions on the free flow of capital (e.g. in China). 
At the same time, demographic factors are likely to raise the demand for 
assets especially in the G7 countries. With the baby-boom generation in its 
prime earnings age, many private households are more concerned about 
maintaining their consumption during future retirement than increasing their 
present level of spending. Hence, they are inclined to save more and to use a 
large part of any unexpected income gain – as it may arise from excess 
liquidity – to buy assets instead of stepping up consumption. As a result, 
excess liquidity may have a larger bearing on asset price inflation than was 
the case in the past. 
These considerations would argue for monetary policy to keep a close eye on 
credit and money growth as well as on asset prices. At present, the signals 
coming from short-term inflation prospects on the one hand and from money 
growth and asset prices on the other point in opposite directions. The former 
suggest that monetary policy can remain accommodating, whereas the latter 
argue for tightening. The ECB will have to strike a careful balance between 
these opposing signals. While it cannot afford to maintain interest rates that 
are inconsistent with the achievement of consumer price stability over the 
medium-term, it will also have to consider the consequences of excess 
liquidity for asset prices and take advantage of periods of economic strength 
to rein in money growth. 
4.1.3 The  ECB’s  response 
Against the background of sluggish growth and receding consumer price 
inflation, the ECB kept rates unchanged during the review period. This was 
broadly consistent with the signals given by a Taylor rule and the ECB’s past 
behaviour in similar circumstances (see Box 4.2). Earlier this year, some 
room for lower rates seemed to have opened up as the output gap has failed 
                                                      
4 For more details, see “Inflation is dead! Long live inflation!” Deutsche Bank 
Global Markets Research, 8 April 2004. ASSESSMENT OF MONETARY POLICY | 33 
 
to narrow and inflation came closer to the ECB’s definition of price stability. 
However, the ECB opted for a cautious interpretation of the data and kept 
rates unchanged. This may be explained by the ECB’s revealed preference 
for interest rate smoothing, where rates are only moved after a critical mass 
of new information has accumulated. But it could also reflect unease about 
widespread fiscal policy slippage and resistance to political pressures for an 
easier monetary policy. In retrospect, the ECB’s caution was vindicated as 
oil price increases brought back inflation fears. 
 
Box 4.2 The ECB and the Taylor rule: An update 
In last year’s report we introduced an econometrically estimated ECB interest 
rate reaction function based on a Taylor rule. Our estimate was based on data 
for the period from the first quarter of 1999 to the first quarter of 2003 and on 
the assumption that the ECB aimed at keeping inflation at 1.5% over the 
medium-term. Since then, the ECB has clarified its definition of price stability 
as a harmonised rate of consumer price inflation of less than, but close to, 2%. 
Hence, we re-estimated our reaction function using the new definition, which 
we interpreted to mean that the ECB would want to keep inflation at 1.8% 
over the medium-term. We also updated the estimation period. 
Our updated equation is very close to the earlier equation. However, raising 
the ‘inflation target’ from 1.5% to 1.8% gives a nominal neutral rate of 3.2% 
(=2.11/(1-0.34)). This is fairly close to a theoretical rate, which we can derive 
from the assumptions that the real risk-free rate in the long-run should be in 
line with real potential GDP growth (which we estimate at 1¾%), and of a 
long-run inflation rate of close to 1¾%. Here are the estimation results: 
i3m = 2.11 + 0.34 i3m(-1) + 0.54 ogap + 0.42igap 
 (5.4)  (2.9)  (6.8)  (2.8) 
adR2 = 0.94; AC(1) = 0.7; for 1999Q1 – 2003Q4; 
where i3m denotes 3-month rates, ogap the output gap, igap the difference 
between actual and target inflation, adR2 gives the percentage of variance of 
i3m explained by the equation and AC(1) is a Chi-square distributed test 
statistic for first order serial correlation of residuals, and t-values are given in 
parentheses below the coefficients. 34 | 6
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Figure 4.7 The Taylor rule: Actual and fitted 3-month euro interest rates 
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Last year’s clarification of the ECB’s monetary policy strategy has helped to 
improve communication with financial market participants and the interested 
public. The definition of price stability as inflation of less than, but close to 
2% has reduced concerns about a ‘deflationary bias’ in the ECB’s monetary 
policy. The reordering and more stringent interpretation of the two ‘pillars’ – 
with the economic analysis of the risks to price stability cross-checked by the 
monetary analysis – has improved the understanding of the ‘monetary pillar’ 
in the ECB’s policy framework. 
However, the ECB has remained reluctant to use the monetary analysis to 
comment on asset price developments. This is surprising in view of 
comments by the ECB’s Executive Board member responsible for 
economics, Otmar Issing, who seems to favour such a broadening of the 
scope of the monetary analysis.
5 It is also disappointing as investment and 
asset price cycles have become much more important forces shaping cyclical 
economic developments in recent years. As we argued in our last report, the 
ECB’s two-pillar monetary policy strategy has the potential to leapfrog 
simple inflation-targeting strategies which leave no room for an analysis of 
asset prices.
6 
                                                      
5 See for example Issing (2003). 
6 This is more and more recognised by advocates of inflation targeting. To make 
up for the deficiency, some observers have suggested lengthening the time ASSESSMENT OF MONETARY POLICY | 35 
 
Moreover, while clarification of the monetary policy strategy has helped to 
improve understanding of the ECB’s policies, a more circumspect style of 
communication by the ECB President has reduced transparency and again 
caused misunderstandings. It has been a long-standing demand of market 
participants and analysts that the ECB publish the minutes of their Council 
meetings or at least give a flavour of the discussion that took place. Towards 
the end of his tenure, Duisenberg took account of this demand by outlining 
the broad gist of the debate within the Council during his press conferences 
following the meeting. On some occasions, he indicated that the Council had 
reached its decision only after intense discussions. This allowed market 
participants to follow the thought processes in the Council to some extent, 
and to better anticipate decisions at economic turning points. 
ECB President Trichet has taken a different approach so far. At the press 
conference on April 1
st, which had been preceded by dovish comments of 
senior ECB Council members and market expectations of a monetary policy 
easing in the intermediate future, he gave no indication whether the tone of 
the discussion had changed compared to the previous meeting. He also 
fended off all questions about a change in the balance of risks to economic 
recovery perceived by the Council. This left market participants guessing 
about the meaning of his and other Council members’ remarks before the 
meeting, which seemed to indicate a change in the Council’s assessment. 
Markets were indeed jolted by the ECB’s communication. Market 
participants did not expect a rate cut on April 1, with the 1-month EONIA 
rate indicating a probability of only 12% for a cut and yields on two-year 
government bonds signalling that rates would remain on hold. At the same 
time, however, markets expected a rate cut at a later time. On the basis of 
Deutsche Bank estimates, the money market yield curve reflected a 
probability of 80% for a cut by the middle of 2004 (see last column in the 
table below). In the wake of the ECB’s decision and press conference, 
markets sold off sharply. Thus, the 1-month interest rate 4 months ahead 
implied by the EONIA yield curve rose by 14 basis points, indicating a 
probability of now only 33% for a cut (see fourth column in the table below). 
                                                                                                                        
horizon for inflation targeting so as to allow asset price movements to be 
reflected in consumer price developments. However, this approach still fails to 
take account of asset price cycles if the latter do not affect consumer price 
inflation. The experience of Japan in the 1980s shows that asset price inflation 
without tangible effects on consumer price inflation is possible. 36 | 6
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Table 4.1 Rate cut probabilities implied by EONIA rates 
  2 April*  31 March 
Duration  EONIA Rate  Implied 1m 
forward rate 
Cumulative rate 
cut probability 
Cumulative rate 
cut probability 
1m  2.04  2.04  0%  12% 
2m  2.01  1.98  16%  44% 
3m  1.99  1.95  27%  64% 
4m  1.98  1.95  33%  80% 
5m  1.97  1.93  38%  80% 
6m  1.97  1.97  28%  68% 
* Calculated before the release of surprisingly strong US payroll data. 
Source: Deutsche Bank Global Markets Research, Bloomberg. 
Interest rate volatility increases financial market risks and gives rise to risk 
premia and insurance costs. Under normal circumstances, interest rate 
volatility reflects surprises about economic developments and is hence 
unavoidable (assuming that economic forecasts have been efficient). In the 
episode above, however, misleading comments and a lack of transparency by 
the ECB were the main causes for interest rate volatility. As one money 
market trader put it after the ECB press conference on April 1: “It would be 
nice if these people understood that their words can cost real money.” 
By comparison, after its miscommunication of the perceived risks of 
deflation a year ago, the US Federal Reserve was relatively successful in 
steering market participants towards expecting a rate increase this year. This 
was achieved by the Fed hinting at a likely path of moderately rising rates in 
the future, thereby guiding market expectations and avoiding an overshoot of 
expectations with negative consequences for asset markets. In contrast, with 
its message that “all options are open”, the ECB failed to anchor market 
expectations and opened the door to interest rate volatility. Not only were 
markets left guessing as to what prompted the ECB’s change in tone ahead of 
the April 1 meeting, but they also received no hint about the ECB’s likely 
future rate path under the bank’s baseline economic scenario of a moderate 
economic recovery. As a result, the money market yield curve has taken its 
cues from developments in the US. 
4.2  The ECB’s ‘secondary’ objective 
According to the Maastricht Treaty, “…without prejudice to the objective of 
price stability, the ESCB shall support the general economic policies in the 
Community with a view to contributing to the achievement of the objectives 
of the Community…”. The latter include “…a harmonious and balanced ASSESSMENT OF MONETARY POLICY | 37 
 
development of economic activities, sustainable and non-inflationary growth 
respecting the environment, a high degree of convergence of economic 
performance, a high level of employment and of social protection, the raising 
of the standard of living and quality of life, and economic and social 
cohesion and solidarity among Member States”.  
Monetary policy can obviously only contribute to the achievement of a 
subset of these objectives, and even this contribution may be limited in 
nature. Nevertheless, few economists would claim that monetary policy has 
absolutely no influence on economic growth and employment. Moreover, 
monetary policy will also have to cooperate with fiscal and general economic 
policies to achieve “a harmonious and balanced development of economic 
activities”. Does the ECB recognise its obligations under the secondary 
monetary policy objective, and has it lived up to it? Our answer to these 
questions – explained in more detail below – is “not entirely”. In particular, 
we advocate a more proactive role of the ECB in coordinating economic 
policies in the euro area. 
4.2.1  Growth and employment 
ECB policy-makers like to say that the best contribution the ECB can make 
to growth and employment is to achieve price stability over the medium-
term. While we agree with this statement in principle, we find that it can give 
rise to misunderstandings. Does it mean that the ECB does not care about 
growth and employment? Should the ECB not support growth once price 
stability has been achieved, as is stipulated in its statutes? Questions like 
these arise when ‘price stability’ and ‘growth’ are seen to stand in a 
lexicographic relationship to each other (one follows the other). In our view, 
however, they condition each other (one cannot be reached without the 
other). 
Traditional monetarists (and others) would perhaps argue that price stability 
is a necessary condition for growth. Hence, if the ECB secures price stability, 
‘growth’ will follow. We agree, if we look at growth over the longer term. 
But causality also goes in the other direction. In an economy where the value 
of money is not debased by rampant money supply growth, real economic 
developments (‘growth’) have a visible influence on inflation. When growth 
of actual GDP is so much faster than growth of potential GDP that the level 
of the former exceeds the level of the latter, inflation generally rises (and 
vice versa). Hence, for a central bank aiming for price stability, ‘growth’ 
matters in a very tangible way. Since price stability is within reach when 
actual GDP is at the level of potential and both aggregates grow at the same 
rate, one intermediate objective (among others) for a central bank should be 
to minimise the output gap. The pursuit of this intermediate objective would 
be consistent with an anti-cyclical stance of monetary policy: rates would be 38 | 6
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below the neutral level in case of an actual or expected positive output gap, 
and they would be above a neutral level in the opposite case.
7 If European 
central bankers would be more articulate about this, politicians would 
perhaps be less eager to commit the ECB to a ‘growth objective’. 
The ECB’s actual behaviour has indeed by and large been consistent with the 
above-described pattern. As we argued earlier, the ECB’s interest rate 
reaction function can be well described by a Taylor rule, where the output 
gap has a coefficient of close to 0.5. The interest rate response to variations 
in the output gap can also be inferred from Figure 4.8. According to our 
interest rate response function, the ECB also takes the development of 
headline inflation into account. At first glance, this appears to detract from 
the focus on the output gap. However, output gaps are difficult to estimate 
and even more difficult to forecast. Hence, keeping an eye on inflation in 
addition to output gap developments is likely to reduce errors and to steady 
interest rate policy.  
Figure 4.8 ECB refi rate and Euroland output gap 
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With inflation reflecting past output gap developments, the cost of insuring 
against errors is the introduction of a backward-looking element into interest 
rate policy. Indeed, the ECB’s policy has been criticised for being reactive 
instead of proactive and it has been unfavourably compared with the more 
                                                      
7 Assuming that money demand fluctuates with GDP, the same anti-cyclical 
policy would follow from a strategy of minimising deviations of M3 growth 
from its reference value. ASSESSMENT OF MONETARY POLICY | 39 
 
activist approach of the US Federal Reserve or the Bank of England. It 
should be noted, however, that a proactive policy based on erroneous 
forecasts of the output gap may be more destabilising than a slow response of 
policy to changing economic conditions. 
A key problem in evaluating monetary policy in Euroland at present is 
indeed uncertainty about the size of the output gap. The problem is 
particularly acute because estimates of the potential growth rate for Euroland 
had to be revised downwards repeatedly (as anticipated in previous reports of 
this group). Such a situation is different from the normal case where one can 
assume that contemporaneous estimates of macroeconomic variables may 
have a certain margin of error around them, but no systematic bias. In recent 
years, however, output gap estimates had to be revised systematically as 
shown in more detail in the box below. 
In the event, the choice of a more or less proactive monetary policy depends 
on the central bank’s time horizon. A central bank applying a high discount 
rate to future events is likely to favour a more proactive approach as the near-
term gratification of such a policy (in terms of its effects on output) 
outweighs the discounted expected losses (in terms of missing the inflation 
target) from forecasting errors emerging in the more distant future.
8 At the 
same time, a central bank applying a low discount rate may find less 
consolation from the immediate benefits of a proactive policy when 
compared to the discounted expected losses from policy errors. From this 
vantage point, the ECB’s non-activist and more gradual approach seems 
consistent with its emphasis on the medium- to long-term effects of its 
policies. 
 
Box 4.3 Ex-ante vs. ex-post output gap estimates 
It is frequently argued that monetary policy decisions based on developments 
of the output gap are problematic because estimates or forecasts of the latter 
are subject to large errors. That these concerns are well-founded can be seen 
from a comparison of forecasted and estimated output gaps. The following 
figure compares the European Commission’s forecasts of the output gap for a 
given year made in March of that year with output gaps calculated ex post 
using a Hodrick-Prescott filter to estimate potential GDP. Since the 
Commission’s forecasts are only available on an annual basis, we have 
interpolated the data to obtain a quarterly series. 
It is obvious from the figure below that the forecasted output gaps differ 
significantly from those estimated ex post. However, changes in output gaps 
                                                      
8 In this argument we follow conventional wisdom that the effects of monetary 
policy on output have a shorter lag than those on inflation. 40 | 6
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move in similar directions, although the forecasted changes lag those 
calculated ex post. 
Figure 4.9 Output gaps in Euroland 
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Had monetary policy been conducted exclusively on the basis of the expected 
output gaps, the ECB would probably have been even slower in raising 
interest rates in 1999-2001, and it would have started the easing cycle a little 
later. The policy actually followed is consistent with two views: either the 
ECB may have been able to produce superior forecasts of the output gap, or it 
based its decisions on a broader range of information than that contained in 
the output gap forecasts. 
Figure 4.10 ECB refi rate and expected Euroland output gap 
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The ECB indeed claims to analyse a large number of variables influencing 
price developments in the future, and it has warned against reducing their 
monetary policy strategy to a simple formula such as a Taylor rule. The above 
exercise supports the ECB’s scepticism about simple rules for the ex-ante 
design of monetary policy. But it does not invalidate a Taylor rule as an ex-
post explanation of monetary policy. With the benefit of hindsight, output gap 
estimates are of course more precise, and a Taylor rule is a reasonable 
reduced-form proxy of the more complex models used by the central bank as a 
basis for its forward-looking monetary policy decisions. Even though the ECB 
may not base its decisions on a Taylor rule, we can analyse its behaviour as if 
it had (akin to our analysis of, say, consumer behaviour as if it were based on 
utility maximisation, although few consumers are likely to have ever heard of 
the concept). 
 
Obviously, any attempt to minimise the output gap would be futile if 
monetary policy would have little or no influence on economic activity. 
Following some controversy in the past, few economists today would 
disagree with the view that monetary policy has real effects in the short-term 
– which is tantamount to saying that it impacts the economic cycle. But the 
question remains: how big are the real effects of monetary policy? And how 
long do they take to materialise? 
In 2002-03, the ECB conducted a comprehensive research programme 
focusing on the monetary transmission process in the euro area. The main 
conclusions were that monetary policy 1) has real effects in the short term 
but is neutral in the longer term and 2) determines the price level in the long-
term. Its effects on GDP are felt mainly through its influence on investment, 
but private consumption also responds. Table 4.2 reports simulation results 
of a 100-basis point rate increase spanning eight quarters with the ECB’s 
area-wide model published (among other results) in an ECB Working Paper, 
and Table 4.3 gives the breakdown of the domestic demand effects of a 
monetary policy change between private consumption and investment. 
The simulations show that monetary policy has significant effects on output 
but fairly moderate effects on prices over a three-year horizon. We leave it to 
the reader to judge whether one should consider three years a short run, but 
the model implies that it takes three years to reach the peak impact on output. 
As mentioned above, the models imply that in the long-term, the real effects 
have to fade – real variables return to their baseline values – while the price 
effects build up and last. 
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Table 4.2 Effects of a monetary policy shock in the ECB’s area-wide model 
(% deviations from baseline) 
  Year 1  Year 2  Year 3 
Policy rate  1.00  1.00  0.00 
10-year rate  0.16  0.06  0.00 
Exchange rate  1.60  0.63  0.00 
GDP  -0.27  -0.71  -0.79 
Consumption  -0.19  -0.57  -0.63 
Investment  -0.72  -2.29  -2.93 
CPI  -0.13  -0.26  -0.37 
Source: Angeloni et al. (2003, p. 40). 
Table 4.3 Contributions to GDP effects of a monetary policy shock 
  Year 1  Year 2  Year 3 
Policy rate  1.00  1.00  0.00 
Consumption  48  50  46 
Investment  50  70  88 
Other  2  -20  -34 
Total (%)  100  100  100 
Source: ECB Monthly Bulletin, October 2002, p. 45. 
Within the components of total demand, monetary policy has the largest 
effect on investment. After three years, the change of investment accounts 
for 88% of the GDP effect. But private consumption accounts for about 50% 
of the GDP effect through the entire 3-year period. After a while, other 
factors (e.g. trade) dampen the effects from consumption and investment on 
GDP. 
Thus, the ECB’s own research shows that monetary policy has an influence 
on economic activity, albeit only temporary and of limited size. It does reach 
the consumer, with the effect in the first year almost as large as the effect on 
investment (although the latter dominates in later years). Moreover, by 
stimulating investment significantly, it gives a visible positive impulse to 
private consumption and GDP growth in the medium-term. There are no 
signs that the monetary policy transmission mechanism has weakened 
recently. Against this background, it is too pessimistic to argue that monetary 
policy can do nothing to support economic activity during a patch of 
weakness. 
The real effects of monetary policy in the euro area are smaller than those in 
the US. There, monetary policy has a considerably stronger influence on 
private consumption (more than twice the effects in Euroland after 3 years). ASSESSMENT OF MONETARY POLICY | 43 
 
The stronger influence of monetary policy on consumption in the US has 
been explained by its lower degree of social protection (making consumers 
more sensitive to cyclical developments) or wealth effects (operating through 
the stock and housing markets).
9 
The logical (and practical) consequences of the fact that after three years the 
impact of monetary policy on output changes sign are often overlooked. This 
feature of the model simply implies that one must look back at monetary 
policy actions over a period of more than three years if one wants to know 
the ‘effective’ monetary policy stance today. For example, there might be a 
considerable negative cumulative impact if interest rates were kept low for a 
couple of years and then increased: the following years would be subject to 
the short-term negative impact of recent higher interest rates and the delayed 
negative impact coming from lower rates much earlier. In order to check 
whether this consideration is important in reality, we have simulated the 
present and future impact of past and present monetary policy actions by the 
ECB using its own model (see annex for details). The result is presented in 
Table 4.4. 
Table 4.4 The impact of the ECB’s policy so far  
  2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 
CPI
a  -0.02 -0.07 0.01  -0.07 0.03 
GDP
a -0.16  0.04 0.44 0.31 -0.44 
a Unchanged policies. 
Source: Own calculations, based on Dieppe & Henry (2004).. 
The numbers in Table 4.4 suggest that the ECB did indeed have a steady 
hand. The cumulative impact of its monetary policy decisions on prices until 
early 2004 (assuming rates do not change) would never exceed one-tenth of 
1% even up to the horizon of 2006. By contrast, the impact of monetary 
policy on demand seems to have been more variable. For example, the 
delayed impact of interest rate hikes between 1999 and 2000 has now a 
positive impact, which cumulates with the positive impact of more recent 
lower rates. When the delayed impact of past changes is also factored in, one 
is thus led to the conclusion that monetary policy will give a sizeable positive 
impulse to demand in 2004. This will turn around by 2006, with a total swing 
of about 1% of GDP. This might be appropriate if the recovery does indeed 
start in earnest during 2005, but could be procyclical if the economy were to 
cool by then (a consideration to be taken into account for interest rate policy 
in the next few months). The level of the impact calculated above depends, 
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of course, on the assumption concerning the neutral rate, which was set at 
3% (compatible with the Taylor rule estimates presented above). The use of 
any other neutral rate, however, would not change the result that the 
variability of the monetary impulse was very low in Euroland. 
It is interesting to note that the impact of past policy changes by the Fed was 
much more variable.
10 In terms of demand growth, the difference between 
2004 and 2005 is about 1.25 percentage points, with an opposite movement 
in the following year. Again, the level of the impact of past and present US 
monetary policy calculated above depends, of course, on the assumption 
concerning the neutral rate, which was set at 4.5% (which seems reasonable 
since it implies a nominal growth difference between the US and Euroland of 
1.5%). However, using any other neutral rate would not change the result 
that the monetary impulse in the case of the US forms a sort of ‘W’ pattern: it 
goes up and down by considerable magnitudes in subsequent years. As 
shown in the annex, this conclusion would only be reinforced if one makes 
the more realistic assumption that US monetary policy will soon be 
tightened. 
Table 4.5 The impact of the US Fed’s policy so far 
    2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 
CPI
a  -0.23  0.94 2.55 1.51 2.25 
GDP
a  0.715  3.47 1.98 3.24 1.88 
a Unchanged policies. 
Source: Own calculations, based on Angeloni et al. (2003). 
To sum up, the pursuit of price stability in the medium-term is indeed 
consistent with monetary policy support of ‘growth and employment’. Both 
policy goals, properly understood, require minimisation of the output gap 
over time. However, given the uncertainty of output gap estimates and 
forecasts as well as uncertainty about the monetary policy transmission 
mechanism, the ability of monetary policy to stabilise the real economy in 
the short-term should not be rated very highly. Hence, the ECB should not be 
faulted for failing to react more often and more quickly to business cycle 
developments. 
4.2.2  Economic policy coordination 
The ECB recognises the importance of fiscal and general economic policies 
in achieving non-inflationary economic growth. Each statement of the ECB 
                                                      
10 The simulations for the US are not exactly the same as for the euro area due to 
limited data availability. See the annex for details. ASSESSMENT OF MONETARY POLICY | 45 
 
President at his regular press conferences and each editorial in the bank’s 
Monthly Bulletin contains references – and very often admonitions – to fiscal 
and structural policies. Nevertheless, the ECB so far has refused to engage 
other policy-makers in active policy coordination, fearing political pressure 
and the failure of politicians to hold to their promises. Instead, the ECB has 
assured other policy-makers that it would take account of their actions in the 
design of monetary policy. 
This approach has failed to induce any positive response from other policies. 
As economic growth grinded to a halt, government budget deficits rose with 
the result that a rising number of EMU member countries are now in breach 
of the deficit limits laid down in the Stability and Growth Pact. Application 
of the Pact itself has been temporarily suspended in the cases of Germany 
and France. Moreover, structural reform proceeded at a snail’s pace in recent 
years and has come to a complete standstill in the major countries more 
recently. Governments have been unable to convince a sceptical public about 
the need for and benefits of reforms. 
The unravelling of fiscal policy discipline and breaches of the Stability Pact 
are the logical consequence of Euroland’s economic crisis. The latter has 
been caused by Euroland’s inability to adjust to a changing economic 
environment characterised by low-wage competition from emerging 
economies and high-tech competition from the US, and by the lack of 
manoeuvre of macroeconomic policies to counter the downturn in the wake 
of the stock market crash in 2000. Reflecting the combination of negative 
structural and cyclical influences, growth of the Euroland economy has fallen 
behind that of other major regions with little hope for improvement in the 
foreseeable future. 
The ECB has resisted political pressure for a more expansionary monetary 
policy emanating from the economic malaise. Moreover, vested interest 
groups and politicians’ fixation on near-term election results have impeded 
the necessary structural reform. Hence, economic pain has broken the 
weakest link in the policy chain, fiscal policy discipline. As long as the 
economy remains near stagnation, further breaches of the deficit and debt 
limits established under the SGP are almost guaranteed. 
The lack of policy leadership and the resulting malaise of the Euroland 
economy may seem unavoidable. Moreover, the ECB’s exclusive focus on 
its own brief, the pursuit of price stability, may appear to be fully in line with 
its legal mandate. At the same time, however, the success of EMU is in 
serious danger if the status quo persists. Under these circumstances, it is not 
good enough for European policy-makers to hope for an economic impulse 
from abroad to come to the rescue. They need to break the present deadlock 
and adopt policies to stimulate non-inflationary and sustainable growth. The 
ECB is the only European institution with full sovereignty over an important 46 | 6
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policy field. It is also the most respected economic policy-making institution 
in the EU. 
Hence, even though it does not fall under its direct brief, the ECB should 
engage other policy-makers in an active dialogue about growth-oriented 
economic policies. The institution’s aversion to ex-ante policy coordination 
is understandable under normal circumstances. Governments may be quick in 
promising structural reform and fiscal consolidation, but slow in delivering. 
However, the ECB must recognise that price stability is impossible without 
economic stability. Rising unemployment and ballooning fiscal deficits will 
eventually create political pressures that could undermine the foundations of 
EMU. Given the lack of policy leadership elsewhere, we see considerable 
risks for the functioning and even the survival of EMU in the longer-term if 
the ECB does not take a broader perspective. 
The present crisis requires an unconventional approach to economic policy in 
Euroland. With the goal of medium-term price stability not seriously in 
jeopardy at present, the ECB should consider easing monetary policy in 
return for serious promises of a return to fiscal policy discipline and 
resumption of structural reforms. There is, of course, the risk that the ECB’s 
downpayment in the form of an easier monetary policy may eventually not 
be matched by fiscal consolidation and structural reform. But the 
consequences for future inflation are likely to be minor in the present 
environment of lacklustre growth. With the possible maximum loss resulting 
from an ECB move relatively small, even a fairly high probability that fiscal 
and structural policy will fail to honour their commitments would result in a 
low expected loss of a monetary policy stimulus. Against this, the expected 
gain could be high even if the probability of successful coordination would 
be less than 50%, because the possible gain from successful coordination 
could lift economic growth significantly.  
4.3  European monetary policy in the international context 
With economies and financial markets becoming increasingly more 
integrated at the global level, an independent pursuit of monetary policy at 
the national (or regional) level is becoming more and more difficult. Foreign 
policies spill over into the domestic domain through the capital flows they 
induce. Affected central banks have the choice of allowing these capital 
flows to influence the external value of their currencies or the supply of 
domestic liquidity, with consequences for their economies in both cases. 
Moreover, uncoordinated monetary policies may lead to inappropriate 
monetary conditions at the global level. 
In the recent past, the ECB has been confronted with a very easy monetary 
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Asia. The low level of interest rates and high liquidity growth have boosted 
economic growth and asset prices across the world. The ECB’s reaction has 
been in line with that of European central banks in the past: it has allowed its 
currency to appreciate, but has at the same time dampened the economic 
effects of appreciation through a relatively easy monetary policy. Under the 
circumstances, this was probably all that could be done. For the sake of 
greater economic stability worldwide, however, the ECB should aim to 
intensify the debate among major central banks so as to minimise the spill-
over from national policies and to achieve an appropriate monetary policy 
stance at the global level. 
Figure 4.11 Euroland and US real 3-month interest rates 
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4.3.1  The US-Asian monetary policy twins 
Following the drop in stock prices that began in 2000, US monetary policy-
makers have worried about deflation. The experience of the 1930s and their 
analysis of developments in Japan during the 1990s alerted them to the 
potentially damaging effects of falling stock prices. If unattended, a drop in 
the stock market could depress consumption by making private households 
feel poorer, and it could depress investment by depriving companies of an 
important source of funding. Falling demand could lead to falling prices and 
the start of a deflationary spiral. Consumers would hold back spending in the 
expectation of lower prices in the future while companies would ache, or go 
bust, under a rising real debt burden. 
Once a deflationary spiral had started, it would be extremely difficult to end 
it again. Monetary policy could lose its effectiveness as private households 48 | 6
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might prefer to hoard instead of spend any additional money (‘liquidity trap’) 
and real interest rates would rise once the zero boundary of nominal interest 
rate had been reached (‘debt deflation’). As the example of Japan 
demonstrated, even fiscal policy might not be able to rescue the economy 
when applied only in small doses and after deflation had become ingrained. 
From this, US policy-makers concluded that economic policy had to be 
applied in a forward-looking way and in large doses to quell the risk of 
deflation before it became critical. Erring on the side of inflation was a 
smaller price to pay than condoning a fall into deflation.
11 The extraordinary 
expansionary stance of fiscal policy in the US is illustrated in Figure 4.12, 
which also shows that, be comparison, fiscal policy has been more 
‘conservative’ in Euroland. 
Figure 4.12 Euroland and US fiscal impulses: Fiscal impulse (change in 
structural budget deficit) as a % of GDP 
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Against this background, US fiscal and monetary policies were eased 
aggressively and much more than in Euroland, where policy-makers were 
less preoccupied with the risk of deflation. While fiscal policy stimulated 
domestic demand directly, monetary policy boosted real estate prices – 
                                                      
11 Federal Reserve Board Chairman Alan Greenspan has described this as the 
risk-management approach to monetary policy. Interest rate policy is aimed 
primarily at minimising the risk of deflation and hence is willing to accept 
possible errors with regard to future inflation. ASSESSMENT OF MONETARY POLICY | 49 
 
which compensated for falling stock prices – and allowed homeowners to 
benefit from lower mortgage payments. As a result, the economy bounced 
back strongly and the risk of deflation receded. However, US economic 
policy has remained easy as consumer price inflation has been slow to 
respond and policy-makers wanted to build a strong ‘firewall’ against 
deflation. This has led to a rise in asset prices across the board and, more 
recently, to first signs of an increase in consumer price inflation. 
Low US interest rates and high net imports have put downward pressure on 
the US dollar. However, Asian central banks have resisted appreciation of 
their currencies by intervening in foreign exchange markets in support of the 
dollar without sterilising the effects of intervention on the domestic liquidity 
supply. Thus, the very easy monetary policy in the US has been matched by 
similarly easy policies in Asia. 
For Japan, the policy of easy money seemed the right answer to entrenched 
deflation. Thus, the authorities bought up record amounts of US dollars and 
issued yen against them. However, with the economy responding well to this 
treatment, the authorities have recently scaled back their intervention and 
allowed some yen appreciation against the dollar. For China, a low exchange 
rate and an expansionary monetary policy seemed useful tools to engineer 
the high growth needed to facilitate transformation from an agricultural to an 
industrial economy. With the economy growing at breakneck speed, signs of 
overheating have emerged more recently and the authorities have taken steps 
to slow money and credit growth. In the event, this will involve a moderate 
and controlled appreciation of the yuan against the US dollar. Southeast 
Asian countries have shadowed the policies of Japan and China, and will 
probably continue to do so in the future. Their main concern is to keep their 
exchange rates stable against their main customer and competitor countries. 
4.3.2  Euroland: The step brother 
Although GDP growth has been sluggish and inflation receding, Euroland 
money growth has been strong and the euro has appreciated. Part of these 
developments may reflect the influence of international rather than domestic 
monetary policy and may have to be addressed at the international level. 
According to Sousa and Zaghini (ECB, 2004), global liquidity has a 
significant effect on Euroland economic aggregates. Based on a structural 
VAR model, they find that a positive shock to extra-euro global liquidity 
leads to a permanent increase in Euroland M3 and inflation, a temporary 
increase in output and a temporary real exchange rate appreciation. The 
authors suggest that the transmission mechanism might work as follows: 
strong monetary growth abroad leads to capital inflows into the euro area in 
search of investment opportunities. This leads to stronger domestic money 50 | 6
TH ANNUAL REPORT OF THE CEPS MACROECONOMIC POLICY GROUP 
 
growth, higher inflation and higher asset prices. These findings are supported 
by Baks and Karmer (1999), who showed that higher G7 liquidity growth 
was associated with higher G7 asset prices and lower interest rates. In a 
world characterised by increased global integration, it seems that national 
central banks are no longer able to follow entirely independent policies. 
Figure 4.13 Breakdown in global real GDP – global money growth 
relationship 
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Source: DB Global Markets Research, Eurostat and OECD. 
As a result of the policy of easy money on a global scale, there are signs of 
worldwide excess liquidity. As shown in Figure 4.13, which is adapted from 
the ECB’s January 2004 Monthly Bulletin, real money growth and real 
output growth were reasonably well correlated until 2001. Since then, there 
has been a sharp dislocation between the two. The ECB feels uneasy about 
how the excess liquidity will be used: “Although it is possible that a higher 
liquidity preference of agents in their portfolio allocation will become a 
structural phenomenon, there are also risks of the excess liquidity leading to 
higher global inflation and/or renewed global asset price bubbles in the 
future”.
12 The ECB concludes that intense monitoring of developments is 
needed, but fails to indicate a possible response. 
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Given the international spillover of national monetary policy, there is a 
strong case for closer cooperation between major central banks. Sceptics may 
argue that such cooperation is bound to fail because the US, being the 
world’s leading economy and having its leading central bank, has no interest 
in it. However, if European and Asian central banks managed to establish a 
credible platform for such cooperation, the US Federal Reserve would 
probably not abstain. Greater awareness of the international effects of 
monetary policy and peer pressure could then lay the ground for some 
coordination. Even if the degree of coordination were very low, it would 
represent an improvement over the present situation. 
Others may interject that a forum for international economic policy 
cooperation already exists in the form of the Group of Seven. However, the 
G7 has neither the structure nor the focus to foster monetary policy 
cooperation. Having been founded in the 1970s, it consists of the Finance 
Ministers – and is attended by the central bank governors – of the seven 
major industrial countries. Since then, however, Germany, France and Italy 
have adopted a common currency and need to be represented by only one 
central bank. More importantly, the G7 deals with exchange rate and other 
economic policy issues while the proposed platform is to focus exclusively 
on monetary policy on a global level. | 52 
Chapter 5 
The Euro in the Global Economy 
he events of the last 12 months have brought exchange rates back into 
the policy discussion. The G7 meetings in Dubai and in Boca Raton 
focused heavily on exchange rates, stressing stability and the need for 
adjustment in the regional areas that have not shown sufficient flexibility. 
The most recent meetings, although concentrating primarily on oil prices, 
have continued to emphasise the need for stability and global adjustment. 
Back in February, EU officials complained that the cyclically weaker area 
was bearing the brunt of the global adjustment as a result of the rigidity in 
Asian exchange rates and the Chinese peg to the US dollar and the lack of 
fiscal adjustment in the US. A round of competitive devaluations ensued, 
with all countries talking down their currencies in one way or another. This 
has reopened the discussion about the role of the euro in the European policy 
framework, the need for international policy cooperation and the best 
framework to manage today’s system of flexible exchange rates. Some 
analysts have advanced the need to establish a system of target zones among 
the main currencies (see Bergsten et al., 1999), or suggested the convenience 
of redefining international institutions like the G7 to accommodate 
increasingly relevant countries such as China (Kenen et al., 2004). 
This chapter discusses the background to recent exchange rate movements 
and their implications for policies in the euro area. Two questions must be 
addressed before discussing the policy choices available to European policy-
makers. First, is the US current account really a problem? And second, what 
is the equilibrium exchange rate for the euro?  
5.1  Is the US current account really a problem?  
The key to understanding the recent developments is the need to rebalance 
what has become a US-centric global economy. The imbalance is impressive. 
Based on IMF data, despite accounting only for about 30% of the world’s 
GDP, but the US also accounted for 98% of the world’s GDP growth over 
the period 1995-2002. In this process, the US current account has widened to 
about 5% of GDP, the largest deficit in more than a century. Using different 
metrics to give an idea of the magnitudes involved, the US absorbs 80% of 
the global aggregate trade surplus, measured as the sum of all countries’ 
running trade surpluses, and its current account deficit represents more than 
50% of its exports. 
Historical evidence suggests that a current account deficit of 5% is the 
threshold of sustainability. In its latest annual report, the Bank for 
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International Settlements (see BIS, 2003) looked at past episodes of current 
account corrections in industrialised countries and found that current account 
deficits tend to be reversed when they reach 4-5% of GDP. Thus the 
objective would be to reduce the US current account to sustainable levels, 
which conventional wisdom suggests is about 2-3% (see Bergsten & 
Williamson, 2003, and references therein). The reasons why a deficit of 2-
3% is considered sustainable is that there is an inflow of short-term US dollar 
inflows which are almost guaranteed by the position of the US dollar as a 
reserve currency. Moreover, a US deficit of, say, 2.5% of GDP would 
provide a useful counterpart for the structural surpluses that Japan and the 
euro area are likely to run in light of the stronger ageing of their populations. 
All in all, this implies that a correction of the US current account deficit of 
about 2.5% of GDP is needed. 
How can the global imbalance be resolved? This can happen in one of two 
ways: through a shift in the world’s relative price structure, or through a shift 
in the world’s relative demand structure. In practice, the BIS study found 
that, on average, a slowdown of domestic demand growth was the main 
catalyst of the correction, although in some cases the currency was the main 
propagating mechanism.  
Figure 5.1 US trade balances with selected trade partners ($ billion) 
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The relative price structure has shifted somewhat over the last year. Since the 
peak, the trade-weighted dollar has depreciated about 11% in real terms. 
Rather than improving, however, the US trade balance has posted a new 
record deficit of 5% of GDP in the first quarter of this year (including a 
record trade deficit also with the euro area – see Figure 5.1 above). This 
might be due to the well-known J-curve effect, but the available projections, 
which incorporate this effect, do not predict a major improvement in the US 
current account deficit for the near future. 
It thus seems that the price adjustment we have witnessed so far has not been 
enough. Perhaps the reason is that the relative demand balance not only has 
not shifted, but has deteriorated: the US-euro area growth differential has 
widened further in favour of the US, an effect that is compounded by the 
higher import elasticity in the US (see Mann, 2002). Therefore, it seems that 
not much adjustment in the current account has been achieved despite the 
depreciation in the US dollar.  
Thus, unless the rest of the world can start growing faster than the US 
(possible), and unless US import elasticities fall (unlikely), a bigger fall in 
the US dollar than expected a year ago may be needed to solve the global 
imbalance.  
Until recently, it could be argued that the US current account deficit made 
sense as the rest of the world invested in the only new economy in this world. 
However, as investment has fallen a lot since 2000, this argument is no 
longer valid. Indeed, if one compares 2004 to 1996 (see Table 5.1), US 
investment has barely increased as a percentage of GDP, but the current 
account deficit has widened by 4 percentage points of GDP.
13 It is thus clear 
that most of the increase in the US external deficit over the last decade is not 
flowing into higher US investment. 
The composition of the trade flows provides a similar picture. Interestingly, 
the biggest trade deficit is in consumer goods and autos, where there is a 
persistent, long-term trend towards a deficit which was exacerbated by the 
robust personal consumption in the US during the 1990s, the very resilient 
behaviour of consumption during the recession and recent fiscal policy-
induced recovery in consumer spending. It is therefore fair to argue that it is 
a ‘non-productive’ current account deficit. 
 
                                                      
13 Using the early 1990s as the base for comparison would show that the current 
account deficit increased by 4.5% of GDP, compared to an increase in 
investment of about 1.5%. THE EURO IN THE GLOBAL ECONOMY | 55 
 
Table 5.1 Changes in the savings-investment balance 
United States  Average 
1990-95 
1996 2004  Difference 
2004 – 1990-95 
Investment 17.1  18.5  18.8  1.7 
Current account  -0.8  -1.3  -5.2  -4.4 
Real effective 
exchange rate 
99.8 104.4  103.5  3.7 
 
Euro area  Average 
1990-95 
1996 2004 Difference 
2004 – 1990-95 
Investment  21.5  20.3 19.9 -1.6 
Current  account  -0.2  1.1 0.7 0.5 
Real effective 
exchange rate 
96.7 100.9  94.7  2.0 
Source: European Commission, spring 2004 forecast. 
Box 5.1 How large is the US current account deficit? 
Critics of the un-sustainability argument point out that the global current 
account discrepancy is increasing and mainly reflects services trade. 
Given that the US trades intensively in services, could it be the case that 
the global discrepancy could be allocated mainly to the US, thus reducing 
its current account deficit to about 3% – and thus making it sustainable? 
This argument is difficult to support, because the savings investment 
imbalance is similar to the current account imbalance, and it is more 
difficult to justify such a large mismeasurement there. In addition, the 
expansion in moving offshore, in as much as it lowers the services surplus 
in the US, lowers the amount of exports available to fund the current 
account deficit and thus increases, ceteris paribus, the dependence on 
foreign capital flows (see Baily & Lawrence, 2004). Moreover, it seems 
that US imports of services, if anything, are underestimated. For example, 
official trade figures show only very limited export of services from India 
to the US, less than $2 billion per annum (and US exports of services to 
India of about twice this amount). At any rate, while the importance of 
trade in services has increased, it still remains of limited importance, 
accounting now for about 30% of goods trade. 
Another route to justify the sustainability of the US current account deficit 
is the ownership definition of the current account. The development of 
offshoring implies that a significant share of trade takes place between 
affiliates and their parent companies. Intra-firm transactions account now 
for as much as one-third of total US exports and 40% of US imports. One 
could argue from the point of view of sustainability that these transactions 56 | 6
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do not represent the same degree of funding problem that stand-alone 
imports do, given that they are inter-company operations (why would a 
company default on its sister company?). nevertheless, they do increase 
the potential exchange rate mismatch of the US economy. If we add the 
net receipts from sales by affiliates to the balance on goods and services, 
then the US current account deficit would be reduced by about 1% of GDP 
(see Figure 5.2). 
Figure 5.2 Ownership-based current account (% of GDP) 
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Overall, taking all of these factors into account, perhaps the ‘real’ current 
account deficit, from a sustainability viewpoint, is lower than 5%, but it is 
doubtful that these adjustments could credibly reduce the deficit towards 
2-3% from a trade viewpoint.  
Let’s now discuss the mirror image, the availability of financing. The quality 
of the financing of the external US deficit has deteriorated. Since 2002, FDI 
flows have turned negative, and portfolio flows have constituted the bulk of 
financing, with a very large component of official flows (see Figure 5.3). As 
a result, by early 2004, over half of all public debt of the US was held by 
foreign official holders, with the bulk of it held by monetary authorities in 
Asia. Another way of looking at the same issue is to calculate the broad basic 
balance of payments, which adds to the current account balance net foreign 
direct investment and net portfolio flows. This aggregates trade and long-
term capital flows, which are supposed to have a long-term impact on the 
evolution of the exchange rate, The broad balance of payments clearly shows THE EURO IN THE GLOBAL ECONOMY | 57 
 
how the underlying fundamentals of the US dollar have deteriorated since 
2001. Given this deterioration in fundamentals, only official purchases of US 
assets have prevented a marked decline in the currency – to wit, in 2004Q1 
official purchases financed almost 90% of the current account deficit (see 
Figure 5.4). 
Figure 5.3 Funding of US current account deficit ($ billion) 
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Figure 5.4 US custody holdings of US government securities for foreign 
official institutions ($ billion) 
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There has been a lot of discussion about the sustainability of the policy of 
massive currency intervention and reserve accumulation in Asia, and the 
IMF has recently warned about the excessive accumulation of reserves in the 
region.
14 In a nutshell, the export-led policies of these countries, combined 
with the Chinese peg and a desire to minimise the risk of currency crises, has 
led governments to intervene heavily in exchange rate markets to avoid an 
appreciation of their currencies. These additional reserves are typically 
recycled into dollar assets, which explains the sharp increase in official 
purchases of these assets. 
The nature of the flows suggests that the financing of the US current account 
is becoming increasingly difficult and relies more and more on support from 
official institutions. But in addition to flows, an analysis of stocks – the US 
investment position – will shed some further light into the sustainability 
assessment. Since the late 1980s, the accumulation of the current account 
deficits financed by foreign capital inflows has transformed the net 
international investment position of the United States from positive to 
negative. That is, foreign investors now hold more US assets than US 
investors hold foreign assets. By the end of the year 2003, the net 
international investment position of the US economy was about $3 trillion 
negative – more than 25 percent of US GDP (see Figure 5.5). 
Figure 5.5 US net international investment position 
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14 See Aizenman et al. (2004) for a theoretical discussion of the rationale for and 
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The net international investment position bears on the question of the 
sustainability of the current account deficit and the associated inflow of 
capital. Large liabilities today increase the rate of growth of liabilities 
tomorrow, and the large stock of financial obligations implies outflows of 
interest, dividends and the like which will have to be serviced with the 
economy’s current output. In addition, this huge negative net investment 
position means that even a dominant economy such as the United States must 
consider the consequences of a change in sentiment abroad about the 
desirability of holding a large share of US assets in one’s portfolio and 
continuing to provide the net inflow of financial capital. The recent moves in 
Asia towards achieving currency independence – notably the issuance of 
Asian Currency Basket bonds – and the incipient enlargement of EMU poses 
a significant potential risk to US dollar demand.  
In theory, a large and persistent current account deficit generates a negative 
net international investment position (NIIP) that grows ever larger. 
Eventually, the financial payments (for example, in the form of interest and 
dividends) arising from this NIIP will become large enough to cut into 
domestic consumption and business investment. However, these external 
imbalances have not yet affected the US external budget constraint. In fact, 
even though the net international investment position turned negative in the 
early 1990s, the United States still earned $16 billion more in interest and 
dividend payments than it paid out in 2003, and the cost of capital – the real 
interest rates – has not risen significantly.
15 
How can the United States have such a negative net investment position, yet 
not owe any net servicing payments? A key factor here is the composition of 
foreign purchases of US assets. Most of the private capital flowing into the 
United States consists of foreign direct investment and portfolio investment, 
which do not require fixed interest payments, as is the case for bank loans. 
Moreover, US entities borrow almost exclusively in domestic currency: more 
than 90% of their external debt to banks is in dollars, and most portfolio 
assets are denominated in dollars. Consequently, the United States has 
hitherto been able to carry a larger current account deficit than a country 
whose obligations consist primarily of contractually fixed, short-term bank 
loans denominated in foreign currencies. In addition, the US has been skilful 
– or fortunate – in the selection of its investments: over the past 25 years. US 
FDI has yielded a return three times larger than foreign FDI in the US – a 
fact that casts doubt on the long-standing argument adduced in support of the 
US dollar that the US is the best place to invest one’s money. 
                                                      
15 Certainly, the very loose monetary policy stance of the US Federal Reserve 
contributed to this.  60 | 6
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The cost of servicing the large net US liabilities could increase sharply, 
however, if US long-term interest rates were to go up significantly or if there 
were a sharp change in dividend payment policies in US corporations. For 
example, if US interest rates were to increase from the present low levels to 
their longer-term average, which would imply an increase by about 2-3% for 
long-term and 3-4% for short-term rates, the debt service cost could increase 
by about 1% of GDP (given its net debtor position of 30% of GDP). 
5.2  What is the equilibrium exchange rate of the euro, and 
what is the likely evolution? 
The alternative to looking at sustainable quantities (the current account) is to 
look at equilibrium prices (equilibrium exchange rates). There are many 
different calculations of equilibrium exchange rates, ranging from simple 
PPP to sophisticated time varying calculations. Two of the main 
methodologies are FEER (Williamson, 1994) and BEER (MacDonald, 1997). 
The Fundamental Equilibrium Exchange Rate (FEER) focuses on 
sustainability but relies heavily on ad hoc assumptions about current account 
targets, while Behavioural Equilibrium Exchange Rate (BEER) embodies a 
mean reversion assumption but contains no assessment of sustainability. A 
methodology that is both workable and focuses on sustainability is that 
presented in Alberola et al. (1999, 2002) which calculates equilibrium 
exchange rates allowing for both internal and external balance while ensuring 
global consistency (this methodology has been adopted, among others, by the 
European Commission for its internal assessment of exchange rates). In a 
nutshell, the equilibrium exchange rate is a function of the stock of net 
foreign assets (NFA) and the evolution of relative prices or relative 
productivities. 
The results in Alberola et al. (1999) show that the equilibrium value of the 
euro, at its inception, was about 1.25. We updated the estimation with data 
up to 2003 and learn that the equilibrium value of the euro has slowly 
declined to about 1.15, as the widening of the productivity differential 
between the US and the EU has more than offset the deterioration in the level 
of NFA. Note, however, that this recent downward revision is subject to high 
uncertainty because it is unclear how much of the recent productivity 
acceleration in the US may have been transitory, and thus of no consequence 
for the equilibrium exchange rate.  
Looking ahead, however, the equilibrium exchange rate of the euro would be 
expected to appreciate again as the extraordinary productivity differential 
narrows and NFA deteriorates further as the US income account starts 
deteriorating faster. In addition, there are several structural factors that argue 
for a secular appreciating trend for the euro. These factors have at times been THE EURO IN THE GLOBAL ECONOMY | 61 
 
overshadowed by cyclical or time-specific effects, but nevertheless remain 
the underlying trend. Let’s review them: 
Although all of them have disappeared by now, a few temporary factors 
induced the decline of the euro since 1999, as follows:  
1)  In the wake of the introduction of the euro, European central banks 
found themselves with too much domestic currency (assuming 
irreversibility of the euro, of course) and diversified their portfolios into 
US dollars, pound sterling and other currencies. This would explain the 
steady downward trend since the mid-1990s, as the euro idea was 
becoming more of a reality.  
2)  The ‘new economy’ fad took hold in the US and somehow in the UK, but 
not in the euro area: European firms went on a shopping spree in the US, 
buying all types of companies to be able to participate in the new 
economy boom. This M&A boom pushed up the dollar as companies 
bought dollars to finance their transactions.
16 
3)  Before the introduction of notes and coins, the black market was 
probably holding the euro down, as holders of Deutsche mark and other 
euro area currencies were switching into dollars and other non-euro area 
currencies to avoid having to ‘legalise’ their monies. Although the stock 
of money was small, it may have been important at the margin in 
keeping the euro down.  
Since 2002, more permanent factors, in addition to the further deterioration 
of the US current account, have entered the scene and led to the euro rally: 
1)  The successful introduction of notes and coins bolstered confidence in 
the euro and probably led to an increase in transactions demand for 
euros. The size of the EU’s GDP is similar to the US and its share of 
world trade is larger, but the US dollar is still the dominant currency for 
international trade. Data from the ECB and the Japanese Ministry of 
Finance show that, in fact, transactions demand for euros has increased: 
the use of the euro in the EU’s external trade has increased and now 
about half of the EU’s international trade is denominated in euros. And 
the use of euro in trade flows between Japan and EU has increased 
significantly in recent years.  
2)  The events of September 11, 2001 and the US ‘pre-emptive strike’ 
foreign policy have introduced a negative correlation between 
                                                      
16 This theory assumes that Europeans were not hedging the exchange rate risks; 
thus they were either taking a huge exposure or assuming that an exchange rate 
of below parity was a sort of medium-term equilibrium. 62 | 6
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geopolitical risks and the US dollar. There has been a clear change in 
perception of what represents ‘flight to quality’ and markets since 
September 2002 – which coincides with the publication of the new US 
geopolitical doctrine – have routinely sold the US dollar when 
perceptions of geopolitical risk increased.  
3)  The move towards protectionism in US politics has also been a major 
driver of US dollar weakness, given the large US dependence on foreign 
capital flows. The mini-trade wars with China – as a result of the debate 
over offshoring and the perception among some US political circles that 
free trade was one of the main causes of the lack of job growth, which 
led some US Congressmen to introduce bills calling for tariffs as high as 
27.5% on Chinese imports – and the EU – related to US subsidies to 
exports that the WTO has declared illegal – late last year were an 
important source of US dollar weakness.  
4)  Since 1999, there has been a decline in the share of dollar holdings in 
foreign official reserves and a shift into euros and sterling, reflecting 
increased confidence in the euro as a store of value. The share of euros, 
at around 15%, is still small, however, compared to the share of the euro 
area in global trade (see Table 5.2). This share can only increase, 
especially if we take into account the fact that Asian central banks are 
the main holders of foreign exchange reserves, and that their share of 
euro is very low compared to the share of trade flows between Asia and 
the EU. In addition, the possibility that China could move away from the 
dollar peg and towards a basket exchange rate system that will likely 
include the euro implies that China would probably have to increase its 
share of euros in its reserves.  
Table 5.2 Share of national currencies in total identified foreign currency 
holdings, end of year (in %) 
    1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 
          
USD 56.9  60.2  62.2  65.7 67.9 67.6 67.7 64.8 
JPY  6.8 6  5.2 5.4 5.5 5.2 4.9 4.5 
GBP 3.2 3.4 3.6 3.9 4  3.8 4  4.4 
CHF 0.8 0.8 0.7 0.7 0.7 0.7 0.6 0.7 
EUR      12.6  13  13.2  14.6 
DM  13.7 13  12.8 12.2        
FF  2.3 1.9 1.4 1.6        
ECU 6.8 5.9 5  0.8        
Others  9.5 8.8 9.1 9.7 9.3 9.7 9.6 11 
Source: IMF. THE EURO IN THE GLOBAL ECONOMY | 63 
 
5)  In addition, the impact of enlargement on the equilibrium rate, although 
small given the small size of these countries relative to the current EMU, 
is likely to be marginally positive. The equilibrium exchange rate will 
probably be marginally stronger owing to Balassa-Samuelson effects that 
will tend to increase the relative productivity of the EU, while relative 
inflation differentials should not change if countries adhere to the 
Maastricht entry targets. In terms of current account, given that the 
combined deficit of the new members (about 4% of GDP) is mainly with 
the EU, the resulting combined balance would probably be still a small 
(though marginally minor) current account surplus. Given their large 
inflows of FDI, the quality of capital inflows would marginally improve. 
On the other hand, there is the possibility of a higher risk premium 
owing to the more complicated governance structure: if EMU-12 has not 
been able to properly manage the Stability and Growth Pact, and given 
that the ECB is already a very slow-moving central bank – in part 
because of choice, but in part also because of the consensual nature of a 
very large Governing Council – it is fair to assume that an EU/EMU 
with 25 or more members will be even more complicated to manage 
based only on peer pressure, thus increasing the risks of fiscal slippages. 
Thus, it seems that structural forces overall point towards an appreciation of 
the equilibrium rate of the euro, and this trend may become self-reinforcing 
as the value of the euro increases (for example, its appeal as a store of value 
may be positively correlated to its strength). 
5.3  Events in 2004 
Summarising, there seems to be conclusive evidence pointing towards the 
need for a current account adjustment in the US which will require some 
degree of US dollar depreciation, and there are indications that the demand 
for euro will grow. With this in mind, let’s now look at recent events and 
their implications for the policy mix in the euro area.  
The ECB has adopted a policy of benign neglect towards the exchange rate, 
with two exceptions: it intervened in 2000 when the euro reached a low of 
0.83, and it intervened verbally in 2004 when the euro reached 1.29. The two 
events would be compatible with a de facto target zone centred around 1.06 
with a ±20% band around it. But this might just be an impression created by 
hindsight. As reported above, most estimates of the ‘equilibrium’ exchange 
rate of the euro are somewhat higher than the centre of this band. Inside the 
band, however, the euro has been free to fluctuate, and has followed a clearly 
procyclical pattern: periods of weak growth have been accompanied by a 
strong euro, and vice versa. Interestingly, the US dollar has been 
countercyclical – from a US point of view. This difference in the co-
movement of the exchange with the business cycle is not surprising given the 64 | 6
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close correlation between the US and the euro area cycle (and the fact that a 
stronger euro means a weaker dollar).  
The pro-cyclical pattern of the euro raises an interesting question: given that 
a very important channel of transmission of monetary policy in the euro area 
seems to be the exchange rate (see Chapter 4), does this policy stance of 
benign neglect make sense? In other words, is a strong euro in the interest of 
the EU? It is, provided that the policy mix takes this into account and 
accommodates the structural strength of the euro. We explore this issue 
further in the policy discussion below.  
A second issue for discussion is whether verbal intervention at 1.29 was the 
right thing to do, or whether it would have been more appropriate to cut 
rates. It depends on the source of the shock. Judging from the analysis above, 
it is difficult to disentangle whether cyclical or structural factors are at play 
at any given time. At the time, intervention was justified on the basis that 
markets were perceiving a one-way bet on the euro, and thus there was the 
risk of a very rapid, self-fuelling appreciation that had to be eliminated. After 
the (verbal) intervention, and despite the fact that the growth differential has 
clearly widened and that the interest rate differential is now expected to 
move in favour of the US, the euro has traded in a tight range of 1.18-1.24 
over the last few months.  
From a positive standpoint, it seems that these structural factors constitute an 
important floor for the euro and are likely to continue to support its 
appreciation in the medium term.
17 If this hypothesis is correct, then 
intervention is likely to be useful only to slow down the process but not to 
reverse it, and a looser monetary policy that accommodates a stronger 
exchange rate would be more appropriate. 
An argument for intervention is that the euro area is broadly in internal and 
external balance, and thus it should not accept an excessive appreciation of 
the exchange rate. Moreover, it is commonly believed that the unwillingness 
of Asian countries to adjust their exchange rates is putting an excessive 
burden on the euro area. Let’s discuss these arguments in turn.  
Is the euro area really in balance? The euro area enjoys at the moment a 
small surplus in its current account, and given its demographic outlook this is 
considered appropriate. The question is: would the EU have achieved this 
small surplus without the ‘excessive’ demand from the US that has created 
the global imbalances? Let’s not forget that the EU runs an ever-growing 
                                                      
17 A normative analysis would argue that aging and the relatively worse 
demographic profile of the euro area would indicate the need for the euro area to 
run a current account surplus, and thus would argue for a weaker euro. We 
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bilateral surplus with the US. Williamson (2004) runs a simple exercise: 
what would the economy of the rest of the world look like if the US were to 
halve its current account deficit? He distributes this adjustment 
proportionally across regions in terms of their GDP shares and does not 
require any area to move into deficit. For the EU, the required adjustment to 
move into bilateral current account balance would imply about $68 billion 
lower EU (net) exports into the US, a bit less than 1% of EU GDP. With this 
result we can then run a simple back-of-the-envelope calculation: if this 
adjustment had happened over the last two years, it would have meant 
essentially zero growth in the euro area. Would we be talking now in terms 
of the euro area being in internal balance, after two years of zero growth? 
Probably not, unless there had been a much larger contribution from 
domestic demand – which probably would have required a looser stance of 
monetary policy – to offset the weakness in external demand. 
In some sense, the EU continues to free ride on the excessive US 
consumption. Recent data show that the euro area has not been contributing 
at all to the financing of the US current account deficit. During the first 
quarter of 2004, and on a global scale, there were $253.7 billion worth of 
foreign portfolio flows into the US. Of this, only $1.1 billion came out of the 
euro area. The bilateral trade surplus with the US is not showing any signs of 
shrinking. The year-to-March surplus in 2004 is exactly the same as in 2003, 
€9.3 billion – despite a euro appreciation of more than 10% over the same 
period. Looking at the equivalent bilateral trade statistics released in the US, 
it appears that the trade gap is widening further from $16.4 billion year-to-
March in 2003 to $18 billion over the same period in 2004. 
The second issue relates to the need for a globally consistent exchange rate 
adjustment. European policy-makers insist that the lack of adjustment in Asia 
– and especially in China – puts more pressure on the euro to appreciate. In a 
recent paper, Benassy et al. (2004), building on the Alberola et al. (1999) 
methodology, try to quantify the impact of the lack of adjustment of some 
countries’ currencies. The theoretical argument suggests that blaming Asia 
for the appreciation of the euro may not necessarily be correct, for it depends 
on the numeraire: in a three-country world, if the euro is undervalued in 
effective terms and it becomes more undervalued as a result of the 
appreciation of the yuan, the euro will have to appreciate even more towards 
equilibrium. In that case, a constant yuan would imply less need for euro 
appreciation than an appreciating yuan. Overall, the undervaluation of the 
yuan magnifies the bilateral misalignment of undervalued currencies (i.e. the 
euro) but reduces the misalignment of overvalued currencies (i.e. the dollar). 
Since both cannot be true at the same time, the impact is an empirical 
question, and depends on the relative weight of non-adjusters in the 
calculation of euro and dollar effective exchange rates. Benassy et al. (2004) 
find that the euro in 2003 was still marginally undervalued in REER terms. 66 | 6
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Lack of adjustment in Asia implied that the euro had to appreciate against the 
dollar an extra 10-15% towards equilibrium, whereas if all currencies had 
adjusted, the euro would have been close to its equilibrium level. Therefore, 
the data suggest that some exchange rate adjustment in Asia would have 
alleviated some of the pressure on the euro.  
5.4 Policy  conclusions 
The large global imbalances created by the huge US current account deficit 
imply that exchange rates issues can no longer be discussed in isolation, and 
that perhaps a new framework for policy coordination is needed. The key 
question is the following: the world economy has moved from a group of 
small open economies towards a three-bloc regional complex – the US, the 
euro area and the Asian region
18 – where all three regions have an incentive 
to play Stackelberg leaders.  
The US has tried to minimise the probability of falling into deflation with a 
very loose monetary policy and a fiscal expansion that, ex post, proved to 
have been properly timed, at the expense of correcting its savings imbalance. 
The euro area tried to maintain price stability and was constrained in using 
fiscal policy
19 – at the expense of stimulating growth to offset the needed 
reduction in US domestic demand. 
The Asian region tried to prevent an appreciation of their currencies in order 
to preserve their export-led recovery, and accumulated excess reserves in 
order to minimise the risk of currency crisis.
20  
The problem is that only two of these strategies are compatible, namely the 
US fight against deflation and the Asian foreign exchange intervention, 
leaving the euro area in the worst situation. One could argue that the Asian 
central banks, through their active buying of long-term US treasury bonds 
and agency paper, performed ‘quantitative easing’ in the US, by preventing a 
steepening of the dollar yield curve. At the same time, the Asian 
                                                      
18 Intra-Asian trade has increased significantly in recent years and now accounts 
for almost half of total trade in the region. The Chinese peg provides an anchor 
to the region, which now behaves in a pseudo currency area fashion.  
19 As we have argued repeatedly in these reports, it is unclear that Keynesian 
fiscal policies have any expansionary impact in the euro area. In addition, the 
large deficit at the beginning of the slowdown did not allow for a discretionary 
fiscal expansion.  
20 Given the very large output costs associated with a currency crisis, and the risk 
of sudden stops brought about by the liberalisation of capital flows, this 
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intervention, by allowing a lower interest rate in the US, has precluded some 
of the adjustment in US consumption that could have advanced the resolution 
of the global imbalance. In some sense, the US and Asia are running a de 
facto currency area, but one based on extreme policy stances and distorted 
prices, which thus cannot be more than a temporary unstable equilibrium.  
From the point of view of policy, it seems clear from the analysis above that 
the risk of a sharp dollar correction exists, although the probability may not 
be too large. In fact, the ECB has in public warned about the global 
imbalances, citing them in its monthly press conferences as one of the 
downside risks to the outlook. There is thus a clear inconsistency between 
the warning of the risk and the failure to actively work to minimise it.  
We have shown that the argument that the euro area is in balance and that it 
is therefore for the others to adjust, is not decisive. In this inter-connected 
world, the euro area cannot isolate itself from global imbalances. If we agree 
on the fact that the longer we postpone the adjustment, the more painful it 
could be, a net present value approach to policy would indicate that 
adjustment should be facilitated now. The question is sustainability. From a 
capital account viewpoint, if the situation is not corrected, the sheer size of 
the funding needs will just overwhelm the world capital markets and could 
generate a sharp exchange rate correction. This scenario, a high-cost/low-
probability event, must be taken into consideration when deciding the policy 
mix of the euro area.
21 A different composition of growth in the euro area, 
with more domestic demand and less external demand, would be 
preferable.
22 
However, from a longer-run eurocentric standpoint, considering the 
relatively worse demographic profile of the euro area documented above, the 
EU should run a current account surplus that could be used later to provide 
the resources needed to finance the retirement needs of older generations.  
But where would the ageing EU (and Japan) invest? Without a US deficit, 
the relatively younger emerging markets would have to run persistent current 
                                                      
21 If we consider the fact that the impact of an exchange rate shock is likely to be 
asymmetric across euro area countries, given their rather different degrees of 
openness, allowing this shock to happen would only further complicate an 
already difficult policy framework in the euro area.  
22 A typical argument points out that a looser monetary policy would lead to a 
weaker exchange rate and thus to a higher current account surplus. Yes, but this 
is a relative statement: in the context of a structurally strengthened euro that will 
(and should) lead to a current account deficit, a looser monetary policy will 
indeed smooth the exchange rate adjustment process and allow for higher 
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account deficits against the developed world. Unfortunately, the combined 
GDP of the emerging markets is not large enough to generate the resources 
necessary to resolve the generational problems of the G7.
23 In addition, these 
countries are prone to sudden stops and exchange rate crises, and thus this 
solution would not be sustainable – and probably suboptimal in expected 
value terms given the high cost of these crises. 
From a world social-planner viewpoint, therefore, what would be the optimal 
constellation of current account positions? As mentioned above, a US deficit 
of around 2.5% of GDP could provide a useful counterpart to the EU surplus. 
But then the US still needs to make another adjustment of 2.5%. It seems 
clear that the incompatibility of present policies in the three-country game 
and the demographic outlook imply that the solution to the global imbalances 
will have to be found in the realm of domestic policies in the developed 
world. In order to reduce the risk of a sharp US dollar correction that could 
inflict substantial economic costs on the world economy, the US should 
correct its savings imbalance and reduce its fiscal deficit. Emerging markets 
should work towards improving their domestic fundamentals so that they can 
slowly afford to run sustained current account deficits without risking sudden 
stops. If these conditions were to materialise, the US deficit would be 
reduced to a sustainable level and as a counterpart the developing Asian 
countries could swing from a large surplus into balance. 
However, if this does not happen, what should Europe do? The euro area will 
have no choice but to allow the euro to appreciate to facilitate the adjustment 
of the US current account deficit. As we have discussed above, there will 
likely be a structural excess demand for euro as financial markets integrate 
and the euro increases its share in global trade and portfolios, which implies 
that the EU could run a sustainable small current account deficit. At the same 
time, it should adopt a policy mix that is conducive to a rebalancing of the 
                                                      
23 Gros (2004) shows that the EU would need to run a current account surplus of 
close to 3% to be able to finance its retirement-related expenditures out of net 
foreign investments. But given the differences in GDP sizes, this would imply 
that emerging markets would need to run a sustained current account deficit of 
about 15%! And this does not assume that the US would need to run a current 
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composition of growth, making it more intensive in domestic demand. Given 
that it will not be able to invest abroad to finance the costs of future 
retirement, the brunt of the adjustment will have to come through fiscal 
consolidation and structural reform.  
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Chapter 6 
Conclusions 
he economy of Euroland is set on a path to grow at an unsatisfactory 
rate for yet another year. While it is now commonly accepted that the 
problems of Europe are structural, the temptation remains to use the 
two classical levers of macroeconomic policy to speed up the recovery. 
Neither, however, seems at present of much use. 
Monetary policy is in a quandary: real interest rates are low by historical 
standards and there is considerable excess liquidity. But the recovery remains 
hesitant and inflation projections one year forward remain somewhat below 
the ECB’s ceiling of 2%. Should the ECB try to give the economy a quick 
boost? 
The argument that the ECB should loosen policy usually starts from the 
observation that there is still an output gap, which should be closed before 
one should worry about inflation. But this rests on the assumption that one 
can actually measure the output gap with some accuracy. We document that 
ex-post estimates of the output gap have varied widely. For example, during 
the year 2000 (the year of the Lisbon bubble), it was widely believed that the 
Euroland economy could expand even faster so that there was at that time 
still an output gap left. With hindsight, however, it has now become apparent 
that the potential growth of the economy was much smaller than believed 
then so that today it is widely accepted that in 2000 the Euroland economy 
was actually operating above potential. 
This line of reasoning implies that much of the criticism of the ECB at the 
time (that its policy was too tight) was wrong. Uncertainty about the output 
gap (and other variables contained in simple monetary policy formulas) 
justifies the ECB’s approach of ‘looking at everything’. Still, even if it 
follows a more comprehensive approach to interest rate policy, with today’s 
data on potential growth, it appears that the ECB’s policy can well be 
described by a standard Taylor rule according to which monetary policy 
reacts to both inflation (relative to target) and the output gap. This is a 
familiar phenomenon in economics. We explain ECB policy as if it would 
follow a Taylor rule, similar to, say, our explanation of consumer behaviour, 
as if consumers maximised a utility function subject to a budget constraint 
(although few consumers ever heard of the concept). 
Fiscal policy seems stuck in a trap: deficits are already so high (compared to 
the low potential growth rates in most of Euroland) that further fiscal 
expansion would lead to such an accumulation of debt that it might be 
counterproductive. But the governments of the large countries also do not 
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seem to be able to muster the political will to introduce the reforms in old-
age protection systems that would make them sustainable in the face of a 
rapidly ageing population. Fiscal policy is thus no longer available for 
demand management, especially in the larger countries where it might still 
have at least a marginal impact. 
Allowing deficits to increase even further (say to 5% of GDP) would 
probably do little to strengthen demand, and might even be counter-
productive in a number of countries hit hardest by the growth slowdown and 
ageing. Fiscal policy thus needs to be tightened. Moving to structural balance 
will actually counteract the slowdown of potential growth in Europe because 
it would crowd in private investment. 
One key finding of this report is that the ongoing slowdown in productivity 
seems to stem in the first instance from insufficient investment. Investment-
to-GDP ratios have not declined dramatically, and the capital stock is still 
rather high. But there are indications that a large part of it is not in the sectors 
of the economy where it is needed. Too much of the existing capital in 
Euroland is immobilised in declining sectors (especially in industry) and too 
little is invested in the growing sectors (especially services) to sustain 
productivity there. 
Why would investment not flow spontaneously into the new sectors? The 
likely reason is that many of them, including a number of services sectors, 
are still heavily regulated in many countries. This is possible because the 
market opening programmes of the EU are usually restricted to trade in 
goods, and only recently has the focus of the internal market programme 
shifted somewhat towards services. A recovery of the European growth 
potential thus needs a combination of structural reforms, fiscal consolidation 
and low interest rates to increase investment and direct it to the new sectors. 
But fiscal policy seems unable to move and structural reforms are not 
advancing. Europe thus appears to be stuck in a slow-growth trap: structural 
reforms are not forthcoming, thus keeping potential growth down, which in 
turn limits the room for manoeuvre for macroeconomic policy. To get 
Europe out of this trap requires one of the players to move first. Despite the 
usual caveats that apply to a proactive monetary policy aimed at influencing 
the real economy, we propose that the ECB should move first. It is the one 
European institution with a reputation for prudent economic management 
and it has some room for manoeuvre since there is no visible threat to price 
stability at present. The ECB could thus adopt a policy of giving the 
economy ‘room to grow’, stating clearly that it does this in the expectation 
that fiscal policy is consolidated and structural reform undertaken in earnest. 
We realise that this approach requires the ECB to go beyond its immediate 
remit of maintaining price stability, but we believe that difficult times require 
unorthodox solutions. Moreover, helping to initiate some policy coordination 72 | 6
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should actually be in the long-term interest of price stability. If the present 
policy gridlock were to continue much longer, one must doubt whether the 
ECB would be able to defend its policy much longer.  
6.1  Implications of expensive oil 
The sharp increase in the price of oil in the first half of 2004 has increased 
the dilemma facing monetary policy as it is likely to increase the pressure on 
prices and dampen growth at the same time. However, the finding that the 
effects of monetary policy are manifested only after a long time lag also has 
implications for how the ECB should react to oil prices. Since the 
mechanical, pass-through effect is immediate, there is little the ECB can do 
about any jump in the consumer price level due to higher oil import prices. 
How large might the impact of higher oil prices be on the Euroland 
economy? A first element to keep in mind is that the oil price has moved 
much less in terms of the euro than in US dollar terms. The level reached in 
early summer of 2004 represented a 13-year high in terms of US dollars 
(around $40 per barrel), but in terms of euro (around €33 per barrel) this was 
actually below the peak of €35 per barrel reached briefly in late 2000. The 
present oil price level in euro terms is thus only about 20% above the average 
over the last five years. 
6.2  EU enlargement does not affect the economy of 
Euroland 
This is the first report by the CEPS Macroeconomic Policy Group since the 
EU enlarged from 15 to 25 members. We do not dwell on this historic 
development for the simple reason that enlargement by itself will have no 
significant impact on the economy of Euroland, or even the EU-15. A very 
substantial increase in trade and investment relations between the ‘old’ EU-
15 and the 10 new members has already taken place in recent years and has 
thus in a certain sense anticipated the economic effects of enlargement. But 
this does not change the fact that the combined GDP of the 10 new members 
amounts to only around 5% that of the EU-15. Most empirical studies thus 
concur that the economic impact of enlargement on the EU-15 will be small 
(but positive). 
Of more interest to our report is the prospect that four small new member 
countries could join the euro by late 2006 or early 2007. Given that their 
combined economies would account only for around 0.5% of Euroland’s 
GDP, this would also have no economic implication for Euroland. However, 
they might have an impact on the equilibrium in the Governing Council of 
the ECB. With three new members, the first stage of the rotation system CONCLUSIONS | 73 
 
proposed by the ECB itself should in principle come into force. While it 
would not greatly change the number of Governing Council members with 
the right to vote, it might have a profound impact if it leads to a situation in 
which national central bank governors become more inclined to represent 
their home economy instead of taking a Euroland-wide point of view. In this 
case, enlargement of the eurozone might have an impact on monetary policy 
since the ‘representatives’ of the new member countries will probably have a 
tendency to vote for a tight policy. 
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Annex 
Calculating the Future Impact 
of Monetary Policy Decisions 
ince monetary policy acts with long lags, as repeatedly emphasised in 
this report, it is difficult to find out easily what the impact of monetary 
policy will be on current and future economic conditions. The rule of 
thumb that an easing this year will lead to an expansion of demand next year 
is not enough since economic conditions next year will also be affected by 
past monetary policy decisions.  
Our aim is to assess which past policy decisions by the ECB might still be in 
the pipeline, specifically for 2005 and 2006 since monetary policy should be 
forward-looking. We concentrate on the impact of monetary policy on two 
key variables: prices (the CPI) and growth (real GDP). In order to estimate 
what effects resulting from past policies are still to come, we simulated the 
effects of past interest rate changes. The simulations are based on the 
impulse responses given in Dieppe & Henry (2004, Charts 2B and 2C, p. 25), 
which are calculated with the ECB's euro-area macroeconomic model 
(AWM). These correspond to the same impulses reported in Table 2 in the 
text (but there only years 1 to 3 are shown). 
Table A.1 Effects of an increase of 100 bp over 8 quarters in EMU 
   Year 1  Year 2  Year 3  Year 4  Year 5  Year 6  Year 7 
CPI -0.15  -0.28 -0.37 -0.50 -0.71 -0.97 -1.25 
GDP -0.34  -0.71 -0.71 -0.63 -0.57 -0.53 -0.48 
Source: Dieppe & Henry (2004), estimates provided by the authors. 
The impulse responses shown in Table A.1 (and also those in Table 2 in the 
main text) are for a 100-basis point interest rate increase spanning 8 quarters. 
After one year, a Taylor rule is switched on to ensure smooth convergence to 
the steady state. The output response is hump-shaped with a maximum 
decline in the third year after the shock. Prices respond gradually in the first 
year and then fall steadily for about six years until they settle on a new 
steady state level. If a Taylor rule is not implemented after the 1st year and 
instead the policy rate is brought back to the baseline after two quarters, the 
deflationary effects are more persistent and output returns to the baseline 
more slowly (see Dieppe & Henry, 2004), but the results of our analysis do 
not change significantly. 
To simulate the effects of the ECB's monetary policy so far we calculate the 
eight-quarter shocks compatible with the observed path of the policy rate. 
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The simulation period starts in the 1st quarter of 1998 and the shocks are in 
relation to a natural rate of 3%. We then multiply the shocks by the estimated 
marginal impact (per basis point) for years 1 to 7 (after that the impact of 
monetary policy becomes less important). 
Table A.2 Simulations for different policies in 2004 in EMU 
Impact on the CPI 
    2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 
(a)  -0.02 -0.07 0.01  -0.07 0.03 
(b)  -0.02 -0.07 0.01  -0.11 0.00 
(c)  -0.02 -0.07 0.01  -0.15 -0.04 
(d)  -0.02 -0.07 0.01  -0.18 -0.08 
Impact on GDP 
    2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 
(a)  -0.16  0.04 0.44 0.31 -0.44 
(b)  -0.16  0.04 0.44 0.23 -0.54 
(c)  -0.16  0.04 0.44 0.14 -0.63 
(d)  -0.16  0.04 0.44 0.05 -0.72 
(a) Unchanged policies. 
(b) 2004 Q3 +25; 2004 Q4 +25. 
(c) 2004 Q3 +25; 2004 Q4 +50. 
(d) 2004 Q3 +50; 2004 Q4 +75. 
Source: Own calculations, based on Dieppe & Henry (2004). 
The results are shown in Table A.2. For 2002 to 2004, these do not depend 
on future policy decisions, but the results in 2005 and 2006 do. Notice that, 
in order to assess the impact of policy decisions in the 3
rd and 4
th quarters of 
2004 we carried our four simulation scenarios: 
•  status quo: corresponds to maintaining the loose stance; 
•  less loose stance: 25 bp increase in each quarter; 
•  even less loose: 25 bp increase followed by 50bp; and 
•  tightening: 50 bp increase followed by 75bp, taking the rate to 3.25. 
We also carried out similar simulations for the US. The simulations are based 
on the impulse responses reported in Angeloni et al. (2003, columns 1 to 3 of 
Table 3) and shown in Table A.3. These were calculated with the Federal 
Reserve Board's macroeconomic model of the US economy (FRB/US). The 
policy exercise is a 100-basis point interest rate increase spanning over eight 
quarters, with subsequent return to the baseline, but the results of an ANNEX | 79 
 
experiment where a Taylor rule is active are not significantly different (see 
Angeloni et al., 2003, p. 16). In the FRB/US model, the output response is 
hump-shaped with a maximum decline at the beginning of year 3. Prices 
remain virtually unchanged for the first four quarters after the tightening 
begins but then fall steadily for about two years (Angeloni et al., 2003). 
Table A.3 Effects of an increase of 100 bp over 8 quarters in the FRB/US 
model 
   Year 1  Year 2  Year 3 
CPI  -0.07 -0.41 -1.01 
GDP  -0.35 -1.28 -1.37 
Source: Angeloni et al. (2003, p. 40). 
To simulate the effects of the Fed’s monetary policy so far, we calculate the 
eight quarter shocks compatible with the observed path of the policy rate. 
The simulation period is the same as before and the shocks calculated in 
relation to a neutral rate of 4.5%. We then multiply the shocks by the 
estimated marginal impact (per basis point) for years 1, 2 and 3 (the only 
years for which the responses have been published). In order to assess the 
impact of policy decisions in the 3rd and 4th quarter of 2004, we again 
carried out four simulation scenarios: 
•  status quo, which corresponds to maintaining the loose stance; 
•  less loose stance: 50 bp increase in each quarter; 
•  even less loose: 75 bp increase followed by 50bp; and 
•  tightening: 75 bp increase in each quarter, taking the rate to 3.50. 
The results are shown in Table A.4. The effects of monetary policy on output 
seem to be stronger in the US than in the euro area. One important difference 
between the two models is that in the US model the proportion of the effects 
on real activity attributable to consumption (as opposed to investment) is 
estimated to be 74% after eight quarters and 66% after 12 quarters. In the 
euro area model, on the other hand, consumption accounts for 43% of the 
impact on real activity after eight quarters and 34% after 12 quarters, the 
remainder being the impact on investment. Hence the impact on investment 
is relatively stronger in the euro area model and the impact on consumption 
relatively stronger in the US model (see Angeloni et al., 2003, for details). 
The mechanism that drives the strong effects on consumption in the US 
model is the wealth effect from the stock market. Changes in the federal 
funds rate result in changes in long-term interest rates, which affect the value 
of the stock market and consequently the value of wealth, a variable to which 
consumption is estimated to strongly respond. 80 | 6
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Table A.4 Simulations for different policies in 2004 in the US 
Impact on the CPI 
   2002  2003  2004  2005  2006 
(a) -0.23  0.94  2.55  1.51 2.25 
(b) -0.23  0.94  2.55  1.47 2.08 
(c) -0.23  0.94  2.55  1.47 2.08 
(d) -0.23  0.94  2.55  1.46 1.99 
Impact on GDP 
   2003  2003  2004  2005  2006 
(a) 0.715  3.47  1.98  3.24 1.88 
(b) 0.715  3.47  1.98  3.06 1.41 
( c)  0.715  3.47  1.98  3.06  1.41 
(d) 0.715  3.47  1.98  2.98 1.18 
(a) Unchanged policies. 
(b) 2004 Q3 +50; 2004 Q4 +50. 
(c) 2004 Q3 +75; 2004 Q4 +50. 
(d) 2004 Q3 +75; 2004 Q4 +75. 
Source: Own calculations, based on Angeloni et al. (2003). 
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